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ABSTRACT. American antidiscrimination law has addressed harmful stereotypes since, at
least, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Stereotypes about the different abilities of men and women,
or of black and white workers, lay underneath much of the segregation and workplace inequality
that Title VII sought to correct. However, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins has radically expanded our
conception of stereotypes as discrimination, and in doing so has introduced revolutionary ideas
to the workplace and the courts. Prior to Price Waterhouse, Title VII had been thought to apply
only to ascriptive stereotyping-to monolithic misconceptions burdening all members of a
disfavored group. Price Waterhouse's extension of Title VII protection to victims of prescriptive
stereotype has constituted a massive, and heretofore unstudied, conceptual leap. This Note
examines how Price Waterhouse's prohibition against stereotyping can transform American
workplace law and analyzes one area where it already has-antigay discrimination. By
contrasting the requirements for proving antigay discrimination under a Price Waterhouse sex
stereotyping theory with the traditional Title VII methods that many states use to protect LGBT
workers, I show both how Price Waterhouse can complement proposed LGBT-specific
protections such as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), and how its normative
vision is a vital addition to existing antidiscrimination law.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 1968, Isabell Slack was stereotyped.' Slack, an African-
American industrial worker at Havens International, was asked to spend the
morning cleaning her department's workspace.2 Slack's coworker, a white
woman, was excused.3 When Isabell Slack asked why she was being expected to
do the work of a cleaning lady, her supervisor explained that "colored people
are hired to clean because they clean better."' The Ninth Circuit found this to be
race discrimination, with perhaps unremarkable brevity;' the court felt no need
to explain how these statements were racially motivated because no other
motivation existed. Ms. Slack's supervisor reduced her to her race-we know
nothing about her own aptitude for cleaning, the cleanliness of her workspace,
or whether she would be better or worse at such work than her colleague. All
we know is that Slack is black. Her supervisor assumed that all African-
American women were skilled at domestic work and ascribed that characteristic
to Isabell Slack with no further thought. This sort of thinking lies at the core of
what Title VII sought to prevent, and has fallen uncontroversially within its
ambit since the 196os.
On May 1, 1989, however, the Supreme Court radically expanded our
conception of Title VII stereotype in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.6 Ann
Hopkins was repeatedly told by her employers to dress, speak, and act in a
manner more appropriate to her sex.7 This was stereotype, too, but of a vastly
different form. Isabell Slack's employer paid no attention to her particular
characteristics, while Ann Hopkins's employer obsessed over them. Havens
International assumed that Isabell Slack was like other African-Americans,
while Price Waterhouse saw that Ann Hopkins was not like other women and
held it against her. Havens International, by assigning a characteristic to Isabell
Slack without judging her as an individual, engaged in ascriptive stereotyping.
Price Waterhouse, by correctly perceiving Ann Hopkins's individual traits but
then judging them against an inappropriately gendered baseline, engaged in
prescriptive stereotyping. While Price Waterhouse has been incredibly important
in Title VII case law and scholarship,8 this simple difference- between
1. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1O91, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 1095 ("Based on the evidence, we think that the district court reasonably found
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment applied to the appellees.").
6. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
7. Id. at 235-36.
8. However, its influence is due largely to other factors. See infra note 53.
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assuming members of a group fit a certain stereotype, on the one hand, and
demanding that they do so, on the other-is drastically understudied, and it
implicates two major problems in antidiscrimination discourse today.
First, a broader application of Price Waterhouse's view of discrimination has
the potential to resolve, or at least to ameliorate, a serious problem in American
antidiscrimination law-the inability of traditional Title VII approaches to
address the realities of modern workplace bias. While the Civil Rights Act of
1964 led to huge immediate gains for black9 and female ° workers, those gains
have recently stalled. Discrimination has, to quote Zachary Kramer, "become
highly individualized;"" specifically, bias is increasingly expressed as a single
factor in complex and multivariate individual evaluation, and is thus
increasingly difficult to fit into the specific, historically contingent model of
open race and gender hierarchies that animated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
This conceptual mismatch has led to shockingly poor outcomes for
employment discrimination plaintiffs and persistent workplace inequality. 2
Professor Kramer stands in a long tradition of theorists considering this
mismatch and its possible causes. Some view the problem as institutional,
arising from structural bias 3 or assimilationist work culture. 4 Other scholars
consider individual decision makers' roles in creating these structural
inequalities, with some highlighting subconscious individual bias as a potential
problem for Title VII law'5  and others considering how structural
9. See John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of
Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, i6o8, 1640-
41 (1991) (discussing the importance of federal civil rights activity in addressing persistent
racial wage and achievement gaps).
1o. See Mitra Toossi, A Century of Change: The U.S. Labor Force, 1950-2050, BUREAU LABOR
STAT. 22 tbl.4 (2002), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2oo2/os/art2full.pdf [http://perma.cc
/OQH8H-QBTE] (showing women's labor force participation increasing by over one-third
between 196o and 198o).
ii. Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DuKE L.J. 891, 895 (2014) (discussing
the turn towards highly subjective determinations in sex discrimination jurisprudence); see
also, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNs 811 (2013) (describing the
importance of individuals' whole, unique identities to discriminatory employers); Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 736-40 (2011) (describing
modern theories explaining this individualizing turn).
12. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare
in Federal Court, i J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,444,449-52 (2004).
13. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, ioi
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
14. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALiF. L. REv. 623 (2005); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, 103 HAIv. L. REv. 1749, 1832-39 (1990).
is. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995); see also
Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 427
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discrimination can result from conscious, if covert, biased thinking.' 6 While
these arguments describe slightly different mechanisms of employment
discrimination, they all identify the same basic problem: workplace
discrimination now largely arises in contexts in which plaintiffs simply cannot
prove a violation of Title VII as traditionally understood.
Building on this work, Suzanne Goldberg argues that current evidentiary
requirements make complex discrimination exceedingly difficult to prove; by
requiring cross-status comparators to demonstrate causation, 7 judges
implicitly demand that employers treat members of a group differently on the
whole in order to generate a cognizable claim, regardless of the impact
discrimination might have on the individual.' 8 Goldberg proposes methods of
proof that would permit courts to consider context, and claims that subtle
discrimination instantiating group hierarchies can occur without generating
the clear in-group/out-group distinctions judges currently require.' 9 This Note
elaborates on how Price Waterhouse doctrines respond to this pressing concern.
The context that Goldberg identifies, and that traditional Title VII doctrines
cannot reach, is a workplace dominated by gendered and raced prescriptions
about how people should behave; Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping doctrine,
explicitly designed to fight prescriptive stereotype, is the tool best suited to
address this problem.
Furthermore, a nuanced understanding of Price Waterhouse can inform our
current debates over how best to protect victims of antigay workplace
discrimination. Although there are currently no explicit statutory protections in
federal law against antigay discrimination, many courts have held that Price
Waterhouse's ban on "assuming or insisting that [employees] match[] the
stereotype associated with their group " ' forbids employers from
discriminating against gender-deviant LGBT employees.' Furthermore, many
(discussing the empirical foundations and legal implications of implicit bias); Amy L. Wax,
Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1135-45 (1999) (providing an operational
framework for courts to address subconscious discrimination under Title VII).
16. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1294-97
(2000).
17. For example, requiring a female plaintiff to show that she was treated differently from a
similarly situated man, or an African-American plaintiff from her white coworkers.
i8. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 75o-51; see also Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash:
Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 6o AiA. L. Rnv. 191 (2009) (discussing the
importance of comparators to Title VII cases generally).
19. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 8o8-11.
2o. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,251 (1989).
21. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290-92 (3d Cir. 2009); Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 ( 9th Cir. 2001); Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender
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states (and soon, possibly the federal government) protect against antigay
discrimination using language explicitly modeled on Title V1I.' This division
between sex-stereotyping litigation and new, sexual-orientation-specific
legislation has put various scholars, lawyers, and activists at cross-purposes.
While Lambda Legal and the Human Rights Campaign minimize existing
protections against discrimination and urge passage of a federal ENDA,23 and
while President Obama has signed an executive order protecting LGBT federal
employees," the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
ruled that discrimination against transgender workers categorically violates
Price Waterhouse,2" and EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum has publicly
stated that discrimination against LGB workers does the same.26 Similarly,
there is a dispute on the merits of Price Waterhouse and ENDA within the legal
academy. While recent work argues that Price Waterhouse protection is a flawed
substitute for ENDA, 7 and many scholars claim that locating LGBT
protections within sex stereotyping jurisprudence is theoretically and
Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 205 (2007); infra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
22. Compare, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. S 24-34-402 (1) (West 2012), with 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2
(2012); see infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
23. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013);
Jonathan Adams, Lambda Legal Applauds Historic Senate Passage of ENDA, LAMBDA LEGAL
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/us_201311o7lambda-legal-applauds
-historic-senate-passage-of-enda [http://perma.cc/W9JK-VZQY]; Pass ENDA Now,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/employment-non-discrimination-act
[http ://perma.cc/QD96-YUD2].
24. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014).
2S. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012); see also
Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 288-89 (2014) (discussing the
EEOC's approach).
26. See Equal Employment Agency No Longer Turning Away Gay Discrimination Claims, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/2o14/o4/o2/2983289S1/equal
-employment-agency-no-longer-turning-away-gay-discrimination-claims [http://perma.cc
/DLgD-R5JG] [hereinafter NAT'L PUB. RADIO]; see also Ann C. McGinley, Erasing
Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 713, 768-72 (2010) (claiming that antigay discrimination enforces a normative
vision of masculinity forbidden by Price Waterhouse); Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The
Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming
Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465 (claiming that sexual orientation is
incorporated into gender, and discrimination against it therefore constitutes sex
stereotyping).
27. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 715,
786 (2014) (describing the Price Waterhouse doctrine as "an ENDA that no imaginable
Congress would pass... [and] quite possibly an ENDA that we should not want").
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practically superior to a separate statute,28 a recent piece proposes abandoning
traditional frameworks entirely for a theory of reasonable accommodation of
gender performance.29
This Note shows that such arguments fundamentally misunderstand the
nature of prescriptive sex stereotyping. The doctrine that has sprung up in
Price Waterhouse's wake does not extend the Civil Rights Act so much as
radically reimagine its scope. Sex stereotyping doctrines ask courts to examine
just the sorts of subjective and individualized workplace evaluations that Title
VII has historically ignored. Courts consider these cases through a two-step
process, establishing the importance of a particular workplace norm to the
plaintiffs firing or harassment, and then asking whether that norm reflects
biased thinking about sex. The resulting doctrine is not a mere substitute for,
or superior version of, protection through traditional" Title VII claims; the
two approaches work very differently, and LGBT workers are best protected by
having access to both.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I considers how American
antidiscrimination law has addressed stereotype both before and after Price
Waterhouse, and in particular how courts expect plaintiffs to show differences
in treatment of in-group and out-group employees under ascriptive and
28. Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the "Personal Best" of Each Employee: Title VII's
Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect
of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1333 (2014); McGinley, supra note 26, at 770-72; Reed, supra note
25; see also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, a Course Correction for Title VII, 103 Nw.
U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 209, 214 (2008) (discussing how a separate ENDA may harm
intersectional plaintiffs); Jill D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis of Perceived
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protection Under the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (2009) (specifically discussing the potential consequences of a
proposed ENDA variant lacking gender-identity protections); William C. Sung, Note,
Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining 'Because of Sex' to Include Gender
Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 513 (2011)
(discussing the greater political feasibility of addressing sexual orientation discrimination
through existing Title VII provisions as opposed to passing a new statute). I should note an
important recent aspect of the debate over ENDA, if only to cabin it- Case and Reed, in
particular, see the religious exemptions in some versions of ENDA as a dangerous retreat
from the protections available under Price Waterhouse, which are limited only by narrow
religious exemptions to Title VII most recently delineated in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). Case, supra, at 1375-77; Reed,
supra note 25, at 309-14. The debate over the normative and political desirability of these
sorts of protections is a vital one, but it is one that falls beyond the scope of this Note.
z9. Kramer, supra note ii, at 896, 935-45.
30. My use of "traditional" is not unreserved, and some clarification may be in order. I use
"traditional" to refer to remedies based on the framework, laid out in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981), that is most commonly used in Title VII litigation.
Many thanks to Devon Porter, who was terrifically helpful in clarifying this language.
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prescriptive theories of stereotyping. This issue of comparison is a serious
hurdle facing Title VII plaintiffs, and one that the Price Waterhouse framework
can handle more nimbly and effectively than other Title VII doctrines. Part II
considers Price Waterhouse in the arena of LGBT workplace rights, where Price
Waterhouse protections exist without any explicit protection based on
traditional theories. This Part considers cases where Price Waterhouse doctrine
could help LGBT workers whose claims would fail under ENDA-these claims
demonstrate not only the differences in coverage between Price Waterhouse and
ENDA, but also how the analytical moves made in sex-stereotyping
jurisprudence could benefit victims of other types of workplace bias. Part III
then considers how Price Waterhouse and ENDA can work together to combat
anti-LGBT bias in the workplace. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
I. STEREOTYPE AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR THE WORKFORCE
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins3  has profoundly affected American
discrimination law, but its doctrines are still misunderstood and unnecessarily
cabined. When the Supreme Court decided that Ann Hopkins had faced
discrimination on the basis of sex because she was told to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry,"3 the Court vastly expanded protections
against sex discrimination in the context of a general case law drawing far
narrower lines. The resulting doctrine, while still inconsistently applied, has
the potential in its broadest form to reach plaintiffs traditionally excluded from
Title VII protection. After discussing the state of Title VII sex-discrimination
law prior to Price Waterhouse, this Part will show how Price Waterhouse
expanded the Court's existing doctrine on sex-based stereotypes to include
prescriptive stereotypes, as opposed to the ascriptive sexism (and racism)
already forbidden by Title VII; how lower courts have struggled to reconcile
Price Waterhouse with traditional interpretations of Title VII; and how Price
Waterhouse's own text, as well as Congress's later treatment of the issue in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, support a broad reading of the case.
31. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
32. Id. at 235.
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A. Before Price Waterhouse: Ascriptive Stereotyping, Sex-Plus, and
Individualized Evaluation
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is often considered the genesis of "sex
stereotyping." 3  As Kimberly Yuracko and others have noted, this is false? 4
Title VII jurisprudence has focused on stereotypes almost from the moment of
the Civil Rights Act's passage, and understanding how Price Waterhouse
expands traditional anti-stereotyping doctrine is critical for understanding its
radical implications.
One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court addressed stereotypes in
Title VII is Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp." When Ida Phillips applied for a
job with the Martin Marietta Corporation in September of 1966,36 her
prospective employer appeared friendly to women. The workforce Phillips
wished to join was nearly eighty percent female.37 Nevertheless, despite being
fully qualified, Phillips was turned away. Martin Marietta assumed that any
woman with pre-school-age children would face "domestic complication[s]"38
preventing her from working effectively, and therefore turned away women
(and not men) with young children. 39 The Fifth Circuit held that Title VII
could reach only discrimination that was triggered solely because of sex and
that, as long as women who did not have children were treated no worse than
men, Phillips could not claim discrimination.4" The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding in a brief per curiam decision that Martin Marietta
could not maintain such a policy unless family obligations could be shown to
be "demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a
man. "41 One can view Martin Marietta as resolving a simple conflict about
universality; the Fifth Circuit held that an employer had to discriminate against
33. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 3d 38, 59 (ist Cir. 1999) ("The role of such
stereotyping has been discussed most thoroughly in that branch of disparate treatment law
developed apart from the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework and known as the Price
Waterhouse framework.").
34. E.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 757, 763 (2013).
35. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
36. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 73).
37. In fact, if we compare Martin Marietta's workforce to its applicant pool, women appeared to
be slightly preferred; Brief for Respondent at 4, Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 73).
38. Id. at 6.
39. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 3-4, 6.
40. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The evidence presented
in the trial court is quite convincing that no discrimination against women as a whole ...
was practiced by Martin Marietta.").
41. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544.
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the entire group, whereas the Supreme Court extended Title VII to cover
discrimination against discrete "subgroups."'
But how discrete, how clearly defined, must these subgroups be? Sex-plus
analysis, by definition, requires the characteristics an employer considers (say,
sex and parenthood) to be sufficiently general to apply identically to multiple
parties. Otherwise, there is no way for men and women to "share" the
characteristic and therefore no discrimination.43 In fact, a close reading of the
case reveals that this very generality, and Martin Marietta's deployment of
generalizing ascriptive stereotype, lie at the heart of Phillips's claim. Martin
Marietta claimed it was using its ban on mothers of pre-school-age children to
exclude employees who would be distracted, prone to absenteeism, or facing
frequent emergencies at home.' By definition, this type of stereotypical
assumption can work only if the category triggering the assumption is both
broad and somewhat monolithic. Ascriptive stereotype consists of treating a
large group of people alike, and erasing individual differences (for example,
does this mother have an unemployed husband to take care of the children? Is
this childless woman the guardian of her young niece?) in favor of applying the
same rule to all members of a specific group.4'
This type of stereotyping is impermissible even when it is demonstrated to
be broadly accurate. Consider Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart,46 in which the City of Los Angeles demanded greater pension fund
contributions from female employees on the grounds that women, on the
whole, lived longer than men. Although the stereotype here was generally
correct,47 the Court held that any employment decision based on gender
violated Title VII and suggested that any ascriptive stereotype unacceptably
subordinated individual to group identity: "Practices that classify employees in
42. See Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta, 44
ViLL. L. REv. 337, 340 (1999).
43. See Heather M. Kolinsky, Taking Away an Employer's Free Pass: Making the Case for a More
Sophisticated Sex-Plus Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases, 36 VT. L. REv. 327, 329
(2011).
44. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 37, at 20-21.
45. While Martin Marietta used ascriptive stereotype to justify its treatment of a specific
subgroup of women, these sorts of stereotypes about general differences between women and
men underlay much of the early litigation surrounding Title ViI's prohibitions on sex
discrimination. For a discussion of the importance of stereotype and imagined sex difference
in the early days of Title VII litigation, see Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Seriously, 91 DENV. U.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 32-56).
46. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
47. Id. at 707-08 ("[The pension plan] involves a generalization that the parties accept as
unquestionably true: [w]omen, as a class, do live longer than men. The Department treated
its women employees differently from its men employees because the two classes are in fact
different.").
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terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about
groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals."8 The Manhart Court
read Title VII to require consideration of individuals 49 as opposed to groups -
stereotypes about how one sex will react to childrearing, or how long one sex
will live compared to another, violate the statute's central aim. s°
Of course, assumptions are not the only way to stereotype. The Manhart
Court described Los Angeles's pension plan in terms of "sex stereotypes" s"
years before Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, but the phrase meant something very
different. Martin Marietta and Manhart both concerned employers who
ascribed actual characteristics to their employees based on their membership in
a protected class. By contrast, Price Waterhouse forbade prescriptive
stereotyping, in which an employer analyzes an employee's individual
characteristics, as Manhart seems to require, but in reference to an
unacceptably biased norm.
Price Waterhouse expanded and (depending on its interpretation) radically
altered Title VII stereotyping jurisprudence. Compared to the defendants in
Manhart and Martin Marietta, Price Waterhouse assessed Ann Hopkins as an
individual. While supporters and opponents of her candidacy for partnership
disagreed on how to evaluate the traits they perceived, all parties agreed about
her actual behavior. s2 There was no inaccuracy or factual assumption involved,
and Hopkins did not seriously contest her employer's factual observations. s3
Instead, Hopkins alleged that her employer had applied a flawed evaluative
system to its correct perception of her behavior. Instead of viewing Hopkins's
aggression as a simple facet of her personality-or a desirable attribute in a
Price Waterhouse partner-Price Waterhouse evaluated Hopkins on a biased
48. Id. at 709.
49. Id. at 7o8 ("The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous.").
so. Notably, when employers ascribe characteristics to an entire class, such characteristics must
inhere in "all or substantially all" individuals of that class. See, e.g., Auto. Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 207 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Si. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13 ("In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." (quoting Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
52. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1989).
53. In fact, the Court's acceptance of those factual observations, and the role they could
theoretically have played in justifying a sex-neutral employment decision, led to Price
Waterhouse's most influential holding-the development of the "motivating factor," or
mixed-motive theory of Title VII law. Id. at 244-45, 249. Congress adopted a related
standard- according to which a plaintiff merely has to show that a protected status served
as a motivating factor in the defendant's decisionmaking to attain certain kinds of relief- in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(m) (2012).
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rubric; was she behaving as a woman "should"?' This is prescriptive
stereotyping, in which assumptions about men and women do not inform the
employer's understanding of the employee's actual nature (that Phillips will be
distracted by her children, or that Manhart will live longer than the average
worker) but instead dictate their evaluation of that nature (that Ann Hopkins
should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely")."5
Therefore, a Title VII that protects against prescriptive stereotyping is a subtly
different beast than the one that came before.
The basic idea of Price Waterhouse -that "we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group", 6 - is uncontroversial, but it has
been applied differently by different circuits. Before considering these variant
interpretations, however, it is important to understand the conceptual
ramifications of a shift from ascriptive to prescriptive stereotyping in
discrimination law. This dichotomy is not itself novel. The distinction between
ascriptive stereotypes and prescriptive stereotypes has been present in the legal
literature for decades s' However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
the impact of this difference on employment discrimination litigation s8 In
contrast to the stereotyping in Martin Marietta and Manhart- stereotyping that
54. 490 U.S. at 235 (describing partners' critiques of Ann Hopkins as "macho" and as
"overcompensat[ing] for being a woman").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 251.
ST. This distinction is briefly mentioned, although not interpreted, in Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 41 (1995). The first-and to my knowledge, only-
systematic consideration of descriptive versus prescriptive stereotype can be found in Diane
Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and
Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y & L. 665 (1999).
However, Burgess and Borgida consider the two forms of stereotype in a radically different
context; they attempt to determine which kind of stereotyping most frequently underlies
disparate-treatment versus disparate-impact discrimination claims.
58. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, What's Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARiz. L. REv. 655, 721 (2013)
(dismissing attempts to differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive stereotype as a
"distract[ion] from the necessary and fundamental attention to harm central to the law."). I
agree with Professor Bernstein that both descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes
dehumanize and damage their victims; however, as I will discuss below, the two forms of
stereotype are very different in their mechanics, and that difference materially affects how
Title VII plaintiffs can prove discrimination based on that stereotype. For a perspective
somewhat more concerned with the specific harm to self-expression wrought by prescriptive
stereotype, see Yuracko, supra note 34, at 802-03. The harms Yuracko identifies -subjective
pain to individuals forced to perform according to prescriptions that clash with their
perception of self, and potential calcification of arbitrary gender binaries - are real. But they
do not obviate the difficulties that a victim of prescriptive stereotype may face in proving the
biases underlying her treatment.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
made factual assumptions based on membership in a protected class -
prescriptive stereotyping takes a problematic evaluative mechanism and applies
it to employees based on their individual characteristics. s9 Consequently,
prescriptive stereotype cases do not fit neatly into the similarly-situated-
comparator model used elsewhere in Title VII jurisprudence. As Suzanne
Goldberg has noted, courts have increasingly come to view comparative
evidence, or evidence showing a difference in treatment between a plaintiff and
another employee who is similarly situated except for membership in a
protected group, as something approaching a requirement for Title VII
litigation. 6' Ascriptive stereotypes, which apply to all or nearly all members of
the stereotyped group and only to members of the group, can be demonstrated
by comparative evidence - Isabell Slack's employer assumed she was a skilled
cleaner and made no such assumption about her white coworker. Prescriptive
stereotypes, on the other hand, will be applied only against employees who
violate the biased norm in specific, individual ways. Because a prescriptive
stereotype does not necessarily cause employers to treat all members of a group
equally, and because the prescriptive stereotype will frequently apply in one
form or another to employees outside of a protected status group, plaintiffs
facing prescriptive sex stereotyping may be unable to prove the discrimination
condemned in Price Waterhouse through traditional methods. Courts have
generally addressed this problem in two ways, either by recasting prescriptive
stereotyping as a bar to advancement for women alone 6 ,- thereby analogizing
sex stereotyping to traditional forms of sex discrimination -or by adopting
radically different comparative models focused on the use of sexist heuristics in
evaluating employee conduct or presentation.
B. Which Reading of Price Waterhouse Is Correct?
Some courts have interpreted Price Waterhouse quite narrowly, requiring
that prescriptive stereotypes be shown to harm members of one sex-usually
women -as a class before treating them as actionable under Title VII. The facts
of Price Waterhouse could support such a theory: Ann Hopkins was able to
59. Of course, status-based prescriptions may be applied only to members of a specific class, or
their effects may be more pernicious for members of certain groups; this is the foundation of
certain theories of the Price Waterhouse doctrine. See infra Part I.B.
6o. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 750; see also Sullivan, supra note 18 (discussing the importance of
comparators to Title VII cases generally).
61. But see Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F. 3d 213 (ist Cir. 2000) (explaining that
expelling a transgender female customer could constitute sex discrimination against men);
infra note 69 and accompanying text.
62. For the remainder of this Note, I shall refer to the former of these interpretations as the
"narrow" reading of Price Waterhouse, and the latter as the "broad."
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show not only that she suffered due to her deviance from stereotyped gender
norms, but also that women on the whole were systematically denied
promotion to partner.6' Between this disparity and the reluctance of many
partners to promote any woman whatsoever,6 4 Hopkins's treatment can be
thought of as straightforward sex discrimination, or as a barrier to promotion
affecting women on the whole. If, on the other hand, we consider Hopkins's
denial of partnership as a punishment for her own, idiosyncratic gender
deviance, then we must determine how an evaluation of one woman's
individual traits can constitute discrimination against her as a member of a
class.
Courts that have followed the narrow reading of Price Waterhouse, building
on a long history of interpreting Title VII as equalizing opportunities for men
and women 6' have generally conceived of prescriptive stereotypes as leading to
sex discrimination in one of two ways: either as unequally applied to men and
women, or as placing women specifically in a "double bind."66 The first theory
makes intuitive sense; an employer who punishes women and not men for
gender-nonconformity engages in straightforward "sex-plus" discrimination.
Much like Martin Marietta's punishing only female applicants for having pre-
school-age children, employers who punish only their female employees for
deviating from gender norms commit sex discrimination as traditionally
understood. 6' At least as applied to Hopkins, however, this "sex plus deviance"
theory seems problematic. In order to prove sex discrimination arising from
prescriptive stereotype under such a reading of Title VII, Hopkins would have
had to show that a similarly situated man-that is, one who violated
prescriptive gender stereotypes in the same way she did-was treated better.
Unless Price Waterhouse had a history of promoting docile, non-aggressive
men in stereotypically feminine clothes, Hopkins would lose. Her victory casts
63. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989).
64. Id. at 236.
65. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[lI]t is
reasonable to assume... that one of Congress' main goals was to provide equal access to the
job market for both men and women.").
66. Brief for Amicus Curiae Am. Psychological Ass'n in Support of Respondent at 19, Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167); Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy
Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, i5 VT. L. REv. 89, 97 (1990) ("A woman who acts
womanly acts in a way that may cast doubt on her competence and effectiveness; a woman
who is thought to be too masculine may be regarded as deviant."). See generally KATHLEEN
HALLJAMIESON, BEYOND THE DOUBLE BIND: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP (1995).
67. See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 471, 474-45 (199o); Regina E. Gray, Comment, The Rise and Fall of the "Sex-
Plus" Discrimination Theory: An Analysis of Fisher v. Vassar College, 42 How. L.J. 71, 78
(1998).
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this interpretation of the statute into serious doubt. 6' However, the
straightforward sex-plus reading of Price Waterhouse has found unexpected life
in some courts as a remedy for transwomen; in Rosa v. Park West, for example,
the First Circuit held that a bank may have committed sex discrimination by
refusing to serve a femininely attired man if they would have served a
masculinely attired woman. 6' The more common narrow reading of Price
Waterhouse, however, and one that applies more neatly to Ann Hopkins's own
case, reads prescriptive stereotypes as existing in equal force for men and
women but as affecting women more severely.
According to this theory- commonly known as the "double bind"-
prescriptive stereotypes in employment place women, and only women, in a
Catch-22. If high-status jobs are seen as requiring aggression, assertiveness, or
other stereotypically masculine traits, then women may be left "out of a job if
they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not."7' Therefore, while
these stereotypes may constrain men and women equally, only men are able to
demonstrate their suitability for prestigious forms of employment without
being seen as gender-deviant. This theory has some empirical support' and
may in fact lie at the root of many persistent sex-based inequalities in the
workforce. 7 However, as a reading of the Court's reasoning in Price
Waterhouse, the double-bind theory has one serious flaw; it calls for a different
doctrinal framework than the one actually used. If we read conformity with
gender stereotype as an evaluative measure applied to men and women equally,
and as one that is only pernicious inasmuch as it hurts women more than men,
then prescriptive stereotype belongs to the "disparate impact" jurisprudence
68. See Case, supra note 57, at 30-31 (suggesting that gender deviance may actually benefit
women). I should note that I am assuming the comparator for a gender-nonconforming
woman is a similarly gender-nonconforming man. This is how such cases are generally
interpreted by courts. However, one can imagine - and Case herself advocates - a standard
penalizing employers who consider sex at all when determining the propriety of dress or
behavior. See id. at 67-69. For a longer treatment of the advantages and disadvantages of
such an approach, see Yuracko, supra note 34, at 776-80; and infra notes 83-91 and
accompanying text.
69. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (ist Cir. 2000) (finding that a
cause of action lay if the defendant treated "a woman who dressed like a man differently
than a man who dresses like a woman"); see also Jennifer L. Levi, Some Modest Proposals for
Challenging Established Dress Code Jurisprudence, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 243, 247-48
(2007) (describing the circumstances leading to the court's adoption of this theory).
70. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
7. See generally Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCH. 1049, 1050-51, 1055 (1991); Larry
Lovoy, A Historical Survey of the Glass Ceiling and the Double Bind Faced by Women in the
Workplace: Optionsfor Avoidance, 25 L. & PSYCH. REV. 179,182 (2001).
72. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 613, 621-22
(2007).
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that originated in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.73 The Court never even
gestured at a disparate impact holding in Price Waterhouse; Justice Brennan in
fact states the relevant standard in terms of whether or not "the employer
actually relied on [Hopkins's] gender in making its decision." 4 While the
problematic effects of the double bind obviously troubled Justice Brennan, the
case coheres only if we begin from the theory that stereotyping is itself
proscribed by Title VII, regardless of its impact on a protected class.
This latter theory-building largely off of Manhart's holding that
individuals may not be evaluated in terms of groups'5 -has given rise to a
broader reading of the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping doctrine. In circuits
that have adopted the broader reading, plaintiffs need only show that they
were perceived to deviate from prescriptive stereotypes based on their sex and
that they were punished for that deviance. Plaintiffs in these cases still use
comparative evidence, but compare themselves not to similarly situated
employees of a different sex; instead, plaintiffs compare themselves to
employees of either sex who are similarly situated but conform to gender
stereotypes to a different extent. A difference in treatment between a plaintiff
and a gender-conforming comparator shows that the sex-based stereotype
played a role in an employer's decision. A clear if somewhat summary example
of this test can be found in Myers v. Cuyahoga County, which held that a
transwoman plaintiff could meet her prima facie burden under McDonnell
Douglas by showing "that she was replaced with a gender-conforming
person." 76 Susan Myers did not have to show that she was treated differently
from someone without her Title VII protected status, as the analysis might
proceed if Title VII covered gender identity;" alternatively, under current Title
VII law, such an analysis would require that she be replaced by someone of a
different sex. Instead, the Myers court asked for evidence that Myers was
replaced by someone with a different gender presentation. Although the
category of "gender-deviant individuals" is formally sex-blind, plaintiffs in
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). According to this theory, an employee must show that a facially neutral
employment practice- here, the policing of sex-based prescriptive stereotypes for both men
and women-disproportionately affects members of a Title VII protected class. Id. at 430-31.
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. See also Burgess & Borgida, supra note S7, at 684
(discussing the rarity of disparate impact claims based on prescriptive stereotype, as
opposed to descriptive stereotype).
75. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power. v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978). In Manhart, the
ascriptive stereotype used a type of thinking forbidden by Title VII's prohibition on
employment decisions "based on" sex. Applying this reasoning to Price Waterhouse,
prescriptive stereotypes based on gender-while not factually inaccurate due to their lack of
descriptive assertion -still make use of protected status in an unacceptable way.
76. 182 Fed. App'x 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2006).
77. See infra Part II.B.
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such cases can then prevail by showing how the categorization reflects
problematic ideas about the Title VII category of sex. 8 The broader theory of
sex stereotyping does not require direct evidence of a difference in treatment
based on sex alone; it instead inquires into the criteria employers use in
comparing employees regardless of their sex, and attaches liability if those
criteria themselves reflect sexist thinking.
Of course, this bifurcated inquiry-what attribute led to the plaintiffs
firing, and does the employer's dislike of that attribute reflect biased thinking
about sex?- raises a host of questions about how to establish the role of bias in
a particular workplace prescription. These are not easy questions to answer. In
fact, this need to establish bias is one reason why Price Waterhouse cases are
more difficult and complex than cases alleging group-based discrimination
under traditional Title VII doctrines. But the hurdle can be cleared.
Historically, Price Waterhouse plaintiffs are often more successful in harassment
cases where the harasser's use of gendered language clearly indicates sex
stereotyping.' Alternatively, plaintiffs can use expert testimony to show the
gendered nature of certain workplace demands 8o or even seek judicial notice
when the stereotype is commonly understood as based on sexist ideas about
men's and women's roles.
8
'
In addition, Mary Anne Case has recently argued that Price Waterhouse sex
stereotypes can be understood as stereotypes that proscribe behavior for one
sex while permitting or requiring it for the other. This requirement essentially
echoes the "sex plus deviance" standard described above,82 but instead of
similar levels of gender nonconformity, Case believes Price Waterhouse
plaintiffs need comparators who behave similarly to the plaintiff but are viewed
78. Cf Yuracko, supra note 34, at 786-9o (noting how, particularly in cases brought by
transgender plaintiffs, courts consider the burden of conforming to stereotypes).
79. In many of the cases discussed in this Note that resulted in a victory for the plaintiffs, judges
relied on harassing comments to establish the sex-based nature of the stereotype at work.
See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters,, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9 th Cir. 2001) ("Male co-
workers and a supervisor repeatedly referred to Sanchez in Spanish and English as 'she' and
'her.' Male co-workers mocked Sanchez for walking and carrying his serving tray 'like a
woman,' and taunted him in Spanish and English as, among other things, a 'faggot' and a
'fucking female whore."').
8o. The plaintiff in the Price Waterhouse case used this strategy. See Fiske et al., supra note 71; see
also Goldberg, supra note 11, at 805 (discussing the potential role of expert testimony in
resolving cases that are not amenable to comparison).
8i. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that, in a case of ascriptive stereotyping where the female plaintiff had neglected to
provide comparative evidence, the court could still take notice of the gendered nature of
stereotypes about the ability or devotion of employees with children). Many thanks to Noah
Zatz for bringing this case to my attention.
82. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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as gender-conforming because they are of a different sex. Case sees Price
Waterhouse as requiring that any behavior acceptable for men (such as
aggression, marriage to a female partner, or a short haircut) be acceptable for
women, and, vice versa, that any trait accepted for women (such as docility or
wearing skirts) be accepted for men as well.8' Notably, under this reading of
Price Waterhouse, such a mutuality requirement- frequently termed "trait
neutrality" 4 - lies at the core of sex stereotyping. Case herself admits that this
standard, with its attendant skepticism of gender difference in areas such as
dress and grooming, has not been adopted by courts.8 ' Nevertheless, she is
clearly correct that this formal structure (if a stereotype applies differently to
men and women, it must be based on sex) can be useful as one of many ways
to show sex stereotyping. That said, inasmuch as one views violations of trait
neutrality as necessary for a Price Waterhouse claim, and inasmuch as Case
presents this test as "in general, a more effective way to achieve legal protection
for the broadest possible range of sexual identities, gendered traits, and the
individuals manifesting them,, 8 6 there is very real room for disagreement.
Case's trait neutrality standard asks, as a threshold inquiry, whether the
employee's behavior would have been condoned if he or she were a different
(generally the opposite) sex."' This is a straightforward question, and for those
employees who can answer it affirmatively (for example, transgender plaintiffs
who are being penalized for presenting according to their true sex), 8 it would
vastly simplify the litigation process. As a sufficient condition to demonstrate
the sex-based nature of a stereotype, trait neutrality is important and useful.
But for effeminate men and masculine women, the "queers, sissies, dykes, and
tomboys"'8 that populate sex-stereotyping law, this is the worst possible
question to ask. Trait neutrality protects only behaviors that the employers
would accept on a member of the opposite sex; in practical terms, such a rule
would permit employers to maintain rigid sexed grooming and conduct
83. See Case, supra note 28, at 1343-44.
84. Yuracko, supra note 34, at 776-80.
85. Case, supra note 28, at 1354-61.
86. Id. at 1343.
8. Id. at 1344.
88. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3 d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 20o8); Case, supra note 28, at 1345-49. Notably, trait neutrality has
been markedly more successful for transgender plaintiffs -this may be because transgender
plaintiffs generally exhibit behaviors that are perfectly acceptable for members of one sex,
but not of the other, as I discuss below.
89. This phrase is gratefully borrowed from Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CALiF. L. REV. 3 (1995).
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standards while simply permitting employees to choose which set of standards
to follow.
An example may be useful here, taken from Case's own discussion of
gender-nonconforming individuals. Case refers to a memorable episode where
then-Representative Barney Frank, emerging from a conference meeting on
ENDA, joked that he had engaged in "kind of a sartorial compromise" by
pairing a conservative suit with a lavender tie.90 It's a funny line. That said,
imagine if Rep. Frank wore that tie to his job and were fired as a result. In a
context where it is clear that a lavender tie represents a conscious rejection of
gender commitments, and where forbidding it represents the imposition of
those commitments on an employer's workforce, trait neutrality would likely
offer no help. In order to prevail under a trait neutrality reading of Price
Waterhouse, Rep. Frank would have to show that his lavender tie would be
acceptable for female employees; however, a woman wearing a boldly colored
tie would be, if anything, more gender deviant and therefore more likely to
encounter difficulties in the workplace. Because Rep. Frank's "gender-
bending" expressed itself in behavior that is stereotypically associated with
neither sex, trait neutrality would allow it to be punished without legal
sanction.9'
To be clear, trait neutrality is an incredibly valuable tool for transgender
plaintiffs and other individuals who can use it to demonstrate sex stereotyping
cheaply and easily. Similarly, plaintiffs who can show that gender deviance is
accepted for members of one sex and not the other in their particular workforce
can succeed under the "sex plus deviance" standard adopted by some courts.
However, treating a violation of these or other sex-plus readings of Title VII as
a necessary condition for sex-stereotyping claims would be just as likely to
narrow Price Waterhouse as it would be to expand it. For those who want Title
VII to offer broader protections for gender-deviant workers, this is a serious
concern.
go. Case, supra note 28, at 1370 (quoting The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2oo7 (H.R.
2o15): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 11oth Cong. 1o- (2007) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank)).
91. Rep. Frank himself acknowledged this point. Id. at 1369-70. Ironically, Frank notes the
requirement of a "consistent gender presentation" as a limitation on ENDA plaintiffs, and I
agree that it is a potentially serious hurdle. See infra Part III.B. However, Case offers this as
an example of trait neutrality's advantage over ENDA for gender-deviant individuals like
Rep. Frank. Case, supra note 28, at 1370-71. In reality, because the trait in question -the
lavender necktie -would be equally unacceptable for both men and women, this example
also demonstrates a serious litigation hurdle for plaintiffs proceeding under both ENDA and
the trait neutrality standard.
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However, trait neutrality is not a major feature of the litigation landscape
for Price Waterhouse plaintiffs. 2 Instead, the two readings of sex stereotyping
described above largely dominate: a narrow group-based framework, which
forbids stereotyping only when it leads to one sex being directly disadvantaged
vis-t-vis the other, and a broader reading that prevents employers from
choosing between employees based on biased heuristics. It is not clear in all
circuits whether the narrow or broad reading of Price Waterhouse applies,
which can lead to confusion over whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to relief.
Consider the 1998 Second Circuit case Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty &
Development Corp. The plaintiff alleged that she had suffered discrimination
relative to her more attractive, stereotypically feminine coworker, 93 who was
given less work and more lenient treatment. Ambrosini's attorney argued that
this difference was based on an "impermissible sexual stereotype" :94
Dana brought Mr. Simon coffee unsolicited and she also cleaned away
his coffee cup. This is something that Miss Ambrosini objected to. This
is conforming to a sexual stereotype. The jurors may infer that because
Dana... looked a certain way, acted a certain way, made Mr. Simon's
life more pleasant in the workplace, even if it was something as simple
as bringing him coffee, she conformed to the sexual stereotype and she
did not complain about it. 95
This is a clear sex-discrimination claim under the broad reading of Price
Waterhouse. Ambrosini, a gender-nonconforming woman, was treated worse
than another woman in the same position who conformed to sexual
stereotypes. Ambrosini alleged that this disparity arose from a difference in the
two women's gender presentation, and that National Realty, in basing
employment decisions on sexed evaluative criteria, had violated Title VII. The
court rejected Ambrosini's theory, reading Price Waterhouse to require that an
employer treat one sex worse than another in order to face liability.9 6 There
was no issue of fact in Ambrosini- a jury had already found for the plaintiff,
who was appealing the trial court's grant of judgment to the defendant as a
matter of law9 7 - and therefore the outcome of the case hinged entirely on
92. Case, supra note 28, at 1356-61.
93. Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 283.
95. Id. at 281-82.
96. Id. at 291 ("[A]lthough [Ambrosini] complains that she was treated less favorably than two
employees who held positions comparable to her secretarial position, both of those
employees were women. There was no evidence that Ambrosini was treated differently
because of her gender.").
97. Id. at 284-85.
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which reading of Price Waterhouse the Second Circuit adopted. The difference
mattered.
However, when we consider the actual harm done to Ambrosini it becomes
clear how, without the protection of a broad Price Waterhouse doctrine, victims
of obvious discrimination can be left without a legal remedy. In essence,
Ambrosini suffered the same harm as did Slack; both were punished for their
inability to conform to their supervisors' raced and sexed realities. But Slack
found relief where Ambrosini did not, largely due to two tangential factors:
Slack had a white coworker who was not subjected to the same demands,
whereas Ambrosini could not find a well-suited male comparator,98 and Slack's
supervisor directly mentioned race in his remarks.99 Whatever harm we think
Isabell Slack suffered, it did not arise from the presence of comparators, and
the gendered nature of Ambrosini's treatment should be clear without an
employer being foolish enough to say it out loud. A narrow reading of Price
Waterhouse, by imposing evidentiary requirements that are unrelated to the
actual harm suffered by victims of discrimination, puts real obstacles in front of
victims of prescriptive stereotype and makes it harder for them to find relief.
Of course, the difference in locating the harm of prescriptive stereotyping is
not only practical- it also presents competing normative visions of the purpose
of antidiscrimination law. We can think of traditional ascriptive stereotypes as
wrong on three distinct grounds. First, one could say that such stereotypes
generate factually inaccurate perceptions about individuals, and thus lead to
decisions that are incorrect or insufficiently respectful of individual
attributes."' Second, one could object to these stereotypes on anticlassification
or formal-equality grounds: ascriptive stereotypes that assign attributes based
on membership in certain groups will make group identity impermissibly
salient in the workplace, while also leading to impermissible disparities in
employment outcomes between in-group and out-group members. 1 ' Third,
one could make a broader substantive-equality or antisubordination claim:
98. Compare Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092 (1975) (discussing the excusal of Slack's white
coworker Murphy), with Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 290-91 (discussing how the fact that
Ambrosini was treated differently than men in her office simply reflected their different
professional responsibilities).
99. Slack, 522 F.2d at 1092-93.
100. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) ("At the heart of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat
citizens 'as individuals ... ') (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)); Benjamin Eidelson, Treating People as Individuals, in
PHrLoSOPHcAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 203 (Deborah Hellman & Sophia
Moreau eds., 2013); supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
101. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) ("Practices that
classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions
about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals.").
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regardless of the identity of those to whom a stereotype is applied, that
stereotype becomes problematic when it has the effect or purpose of
suppressing disfavored groups. °2 However, if we are to believe that the
problem with stereotype extends to unfair prescription, then we must reject the
first of these theories; prescriptive stereotype consists of normative judgments
that, ipso facto, can never be factually inaccurate. Similarly, such stereotypes
begin with a (theoretically) accurate view of an individual's traits and
behaviors; this would seem to satisfy the autonomy interests implicated by
individuality claims. So we are left with formal and substantive equality as two
different bases for attacking prescriptive stereotype.
To return to Ambrosini, the court's holding can be seen as limiting Price
Waterhouse to violations of formal equality; because Ambrosini did not show
that her treatment differed from that of a man, her employer was sex-blind for
purposes of the statute. The plaintiff argued in contrast that the stereotype
deployed against her violated Price Waterhouse due to its inherently oppressive
content, regardless of its sex-blind application. If we subscribe to the
substantive-equality reading of sex stereotyping, then the Title VII violation is
clear. A prescription that women should be servile and men dominant,"3 even
if applied to all employees in a specific workplace, would obviously reinforce a
degrading and subordinating workplace culture. The question becomes: after
Price Waterhouse, does Title VII forbid employers from using evaluative criteria
that reflect biased thinking, or merely from applying their evaluative criteria in
biased ways?
It is still unsettled which version of sex stereotyping doctrine reads Price
Waterhouse correctly. The opinion itself- or, more properly, opinions -offer
some support for both interpretations, but a close reading of Price Waterhouse
and of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (which overrode parts of the decision)
support a broad reading. While Price Waterhouse was a plurality opinion,
Justices Brennan and O'Connor, representing five total votes, both expressed
less concern with disparities in treatment between men and women than with
ioa. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 58, at 665-71 (offering an account of how stereotypes are used
to justify constraints on members of stereotyped classes); see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117
HARv. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004) (explaining the practical and theoretical differences
between anticlassification and antisubordination principles in the context of racial equality,
and providing an extensive bibliography on the subject). Vicki Schultz, in particular, has
argued for an antistereotyping principle based specifically on the power of stereotypes to
create the very reality which they purport to address; because individuals feel pressure to
conform to stereotype in the workforce, these stereotypes generate real and distressing
differences in behavior among men and women. See Schultz, supra note 45 (manuscript at
123-26).
103. See Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 283 (alleging a workplace norm benefitting women who
perform menial tasks for men).
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the influence of impermissible considerations in the hiring process. While the
bottom-line disparities between men and women were more than sufficient to
support an inference of discrimination, °4 Justices Brennan and O'Connor both
went out of their way to frame the stereotype that affected Ann Hopkins not as
a factor that caused an impermissible difference in Price Waterhouse's
treatment of men and women, but as a form of impermissible treatment in and
of itself.l0s Furthermore, while language in Justice O'Connor's concurrence
expresses discomfort with using Title VII to police evaluations in the total
absence of a difference in outcomes,6 this part of her opinion was superseded
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was explicitly adopted in order to override
problematic aspects of several then-recent Supreme Court employment
decisions," 7 and its treatment of Price Waterhouse aroused far less discussion
(and thus less legislative history) than other aspects of the bill.1, 8 That said,
what evidence there is suggests that the Civil Rights Act's "motivating factor"
provision was intended to overrule any requirement of disparity in outcome.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 established an "unlawful employment practice...
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice."'0 9 Once a
plaintiff has proven a discriminatory motive, liability is assigned -an employer
104. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 684-85 (discussing the strength of Ann Hopkins's case).
105. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1989) ("Congress meant to obligate
[the plaintiff] to prove that the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to
its decision."); id. at 251 ("[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group . . . ."); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("There is no doubt that Congress
considered reliance on gender or race in making employment decisions an evil in itself ...
While the main concern of the statute was with employment opportunity, Congress was
certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process
which treats one as an inferior by reason of one's race or sex.").
io6. Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The legislative history makes it clear that Congress
was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the employment setting, not mere
discriminatory thoughts.").
107. In addition to Price Waterhouse, these cases included Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989); and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See also
Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEx. L. REV. 1317, 1337 (2014) (referring
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as "the leading 'liberal' override of the last two generations").
io8. Congress's response to the Wards Cove decision was particularly controversial, and
opponents of the bill alleged that it would create informal hiring quotas. See, e.g., 137 CONG.
REC. S227 7 -7 8 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Simon) (describing the state of
the debate).
lo9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added).
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who demonstrates that she would have made the same decision in the absence
of the impermissible factor cannot be forced to reinstate the employee or pay
damages, but the plaintiff remains entitled to declaratory relief and attorneys'
fees.1 ' By comparison, Justices Brennan and O'Connor both found that, if the
employer could show that the same decision would have been made absent
discrimination, then he would be absolved of all liability."' In the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, Congress explicitly stated that impermissible motivations, without
impermissible differences in outcome, suffice for Title VII liability. It is difficult to
square this reading with a requirement that plaintiffs show disparate outcomes
between cross-status comparators in order to merit even fees and declaratory
relief. Since the cross-status comparator is most relevant to demonstrating
whether or not the employer would have made the same decision absent
discrimination, this requirement collapses the two prongs of the statutory test
and renders the same-decision language surplusage. While comparative
evidence is always useful in proving the salience of one particular factor to a
decision, the actual wrong lies in the stereotype itself, and not in its operation
to generate workplace disparities. '
This plain-meaning analysis is further supported by the legislative history
of the Act. While earlier language had required a plaintiff to show that the
discriminatory motive was a "contributing" factor, this language was
specifically changed to remove any implication of an impact requirement. 13
Unlike "contributing," which queries the causal chain leading to an adverse
decision, "motivating" suggests a specific concern with employers' reasoning;
Justice O'Connor rejected this language precisely due to her discomfort with
reading Title VII to require that type of analysis. 14 By amending the original
draft to include Brennan's "motivating factor" language, Congress explicitly
authorized courts to consider motivation."' While both Justices Brennan and
11o. This is commonly referred to as the "same decision" test. Id. § 20ooe-5(g)(2)(b).
mn. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252, 254 (establishing the motivating factor test, but making
the same decision test into a full defense to liability); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(requiring the plaintiff to show "that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an
adverse employment decision").
112. In fact, given that prescriptive stereotypes are often most visible in disparities in treatment
between members of a group who conform to the stereotype and members of the same
group who do not, the most relevant comparator for proving the existence of an
impermissible motivating stereotype will likely be of the same status as the plaintiff. See
supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
113. See 137 CONG. REc. H392o (daily ed. June 5, 1991).
114. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. See 137 CONG. REC. 28,638 (i99i) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (clarifying that the
"motivating factor" language "mak[es] it unlawful for an employer to rely on a
discriminatory factor in making a job decision").
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
O'Connor contemplated using Title VII to query employers' evaluative
methods, Congress took this process one step further by permitting liability on
the basis of such methods alone, without considering the differences in
treatment required by some courts. As amended in 1991, Title VII clearly
allows for the "biased criteria" analysis that underlies the broad reading of Price
Waterhouse prescriptive stereotype protection.
While this broader interpretation of Price Waterhouse is still not universal,
its reach is expanding." 6 The Supreme Court itself has not clearly addressed
the issue. It offered ambiguous support for the narrow reading of Price
Waterhouse in its 1998 decision Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services," 7 but the
decision has only generated further confusion in its progeny, and has not been
clarified at the Supreme Court level. Oncale, a case holding that male-on-male
sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII, would at first seem to be an
ideal test case for disaggregating the two readings of Price Waterhouse." '
Joseph Oncale faced adverse employment action"9 based on perceived deviance
from gendered norms, but was harassed by members of his own sex. 2 ' Oncale
116. While the antisubordination implications of broader readings of Price Waterhouse have not
to my knowledge been discussed elsewhere, the impact of this circuit split has -particularly
in its impact on LGBT Price Waterhouse plaintiffs. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 21. In
particular, the Second Circuit's evolving views on this issue constitute a particularly well-
documented example of the shift between the two readings. Compare Galdieri-Ambrosini v.
Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1998), with Miller v. City of New York, 177
F. App'x 195 (2d Cir. 2006) (formally adopting the broadest reading of Price Waterhouse, but
focusing on the plaintiff's disability and comparing him to nondisabled employees, as
opposed to employees with a more traditionally masculine gender presentation, which was
the theory put forward by the plaintiff himself); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
Sch. Dist., 365 F. 3d 107, 117-22 (2d Cir. 2004) (adopting the broad reading of Price
Waterhouse, but in the specific case where the prescriptive stereotype required women to
stay out of the workforce, and where the plaintiffs lack of male comparators appeared to
have been an oversight); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (signaling an
openness to "relief... for discrimination based upon sexual stereotypes" in dicta); Trigg v.
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 2001 WL 868336, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001) (reiterating
Simonton's use of a gender-discrimination analysis while holding it inapplicable to the
present case). Cf Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 18, Miller, 177 F. App'x 195, No. 04-5536
(referring only to the plaintiffs being "smaller-framed")).
117. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
118. David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment
Law, 15o U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1742 (2002) ("The facts of Oncale seem to call out for the
invocation of a sex-stereotyping theory of sexual harassment, relying on Price Waterhouse.").
iig. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. While the actions taken against Hopkins were more tangible, Oncale
clearly alleged harassment that was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[his] employment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 51o U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
i2o. "No women were employed by Sundowner on that rig or on any other rig." Brief for
Respondent at 1, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568).
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was victimized by prescriptive sex stereotypes in a way that clearly did not
disadvantage men as a class. 21 The Court's decision in Oncale, however, punted
the issue. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, merely reaffirmed that
Title VII protects against harassment "because ... of sex."" The Court then
provided a nonexhaustive list of methods by which a plaintiff could show
causation, all falling under the narrow reading of Price Waterhouse,"3 before
rejecting Sundowner's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed even though
Oncale had alleged no facts that would suffice to state a claim under a narrow
Price Waterhouse theory-Oncale never alleged that he would have received
better treatment if he had been a woman" -which strongly suggests that the
Court felt Oncale met his burden without having to introduce evidence
showing discrimination against men. The Court never clarified further; Oncale
settled the case days before further proceedings were to begin."'
Further confusing the matter, five days after its decision in Oncale the
Court vacated a Seventh Circuit decision that read Price Waterhouse broadly
"for further consideration in light of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. "1 6
While this decision might suggest discomfort with the broad reading of Price
Waterhouse, later decisions in the Seventh Circuit continue to read Price
121. In fact, women entering traditionally male workplaces often experience similar harassment.
See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1769-74 (1998);
Schultz, supra note 14, at 1832-39.
122. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
123. Id. at 8o-8i ("The ... inference [of discrimination based on sex] would be available to a
plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was
homosexual .... A trier of fact might [also] reasonably find such discrimination . . . if a
female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in
the workplace. A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace.").
124. See Schwartz, supra note 118, at 1734. The circumstances clearly warranted vacatur, as Oncale
could (and later did) make allegations more closely resembling Scalia's examples; reversal,
holding that the claims already made by Oncale were sufficient to survive 12(b)(6) scrutiny,
suggests greater openness to a broad reading of Price Waterhouse than does the case's explicit
reasoning.
125. See Mary Judice, La. Offshore Worker Settles Sex Suit, Harassment Case Made History in
Supreme Court, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 24, 1998, at Cl; Sun Sets on Sundowner,
TEx. LAW., Nov. 2, 1998, at 3.
126. City of Belleville v. Doe by Doe, 523 U.S. lOO (1998) (vacating and remanding Doe by Doe
v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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Waterhouse broadly,'27 and in fact the original Belleville decision is still cited
approvingly elsewhere.12s
The ambiguity surrounding Price Waterhouse has created a sex-stereotyping
doctrine that still varies from circuit to circuit, but the decision itself, as well as
later legislative and judicial behavior, indicates that Price Waterhouse prohibits
stereotypes that work indirectly to subordinate protected groups. Under this
reading, Price Waterhouse is a substantial innovation in antidiscrimination law;
Price Waterhouse breaks with the comparative, group-disparity model that
governs the rest of Title VII jurisprudence and offers a more context-sensitive
and nuanced way to think about workplace bias. The next Part will consider
Price Waterhouse in the area where it has been perhaps most generative: in cases
protecting gender-deviant LGBT employees. In the absence of ENDA, gay and
transgender victims of discrimination have turned to Price Waterhouse for
relief; now, as states increasingly enact more traditional protections against
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination, LGBT plaintiffs are
running on parallel tracks. A close analysis of these cases makes clear not only
how sex stereotyping can complement ENDA, but also how the ideas
underlying sex stereotyping can complement traditional Title VII protections
for all classes of plaintiffs.
II. ANTIGAY DISCRIMINATION, OR SEX STEREOTYPING?
COMPARING PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ENDA IN SELECTED
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS
Employment protections for LGBT plaintiffs under current law are, to say
the least, a piece of work. Courts considering claims by LGBT plaintiffs must
balance prohibitions on discrimination based on ideas about how men and
women should behave with a total lack of explicit federal protection against
antigay discrimination. This riddle bedevils both courts, which struggle to
differentiate between gender deviance and sexual orientation, and advocates,
who use Price Waterhouse protections to the best of their ability while also
fighting for LGBT protections under a different, more traditional model. These
advocates have met with some success -many states and municipalities offer
formal protection against sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination, creating an environment in which anti-LGBT discrimination
can be fought using two vastly different theories. These fact patterns are ideal
127. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3 d 1O58, 1o64 (7 th Cir. 2003) (holding
that Price Waterhouse required a difference in treatment between the plaintiff and gender-
conforming members of the same sex).
iz8. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 26o F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002).
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test cases for exploring just how Price Waterhouse differs from traditional
understandings of Title VII. More importantly, these cases show how Price
Waterhouse improves on those understandings and offers solutions to truly
vexing problems in American antidiscrimination law. After briefly considering
the state of current and proposed law addressing sexual orientation, gender
identity, and gender deviance discrimination, this Part uses the LGBT example
to show how Price Waterhouse can address "corner cases" in which clear
discrimination cannot be fit into traditional Title VII standards of proof.
A. Price Waterhouse and ENDA: The Bifurcated Landscape of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination
LGBT plaintiffs currently have two separate theories for redressing antigay
discrimination, but both are limited and highly contingent. Many courts have
interpreted Price Waterhouse to hold that discrimination against LGBT
employees is based on their perceived violation of gendered prescriptions and
thus constitutes sex stereotyping, but only if the discrimination arises from the
plaintiffs perceived gender deviance and not from anti-LGBT bias per se.
Otherwise, a separate, older doctrine bars relief. The first case to address Title
VII's applicability to sexual minorities, DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,129 used legislative history to foreclose "bootstrapping" sexual orientation
protection into Title VJI. 3° DeSantis has never been addressed by the Supreme
Court, but it (and decisions like it in other circuits) bar relief for plaintiffs
alleging sexual orientation discrimination. However, plaintiffs who allege that
they were seen as violating gender stereotypes may seek relief under a Price
Waterhouse theory, even if the harasser perceived his victim as homosexual,13'
and even if large parts of the harassment consisted of antigay speech.'32
The DeSantis plaintiffs alleged that discrimination against homosexuals
constituted "sex-plus" discrimination against men under Martin Marietta33 and
izg. 6o8 F.2d 327 (9 th Cir. 1979).
130. Id. at 329-30 (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9 th Cir.
1977)); see also, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3 d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)
(demonstrating the continued relevance of the bootstrapping doctrine).
131. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cit. 2009). But see Centola v. Potter,
183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (dismissing a defendant's claim that the plaintiff
suffered only sexual orientation discrimination on the grounds that "Centola never disclosed
his sexual orientation to anyone at work" and thereby suggesting that a sex stereotyping
plaintiff will have a stronger case if he does not disclose his sexual orientation at work).
132. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287-88 (discussing how lubricating jelly was left in the plaintiff's
workspace, how the plaintiff was called "fag" or "faggot," and how the plaintiff was accused
of having AIDS).
133. DeSantis, 6o8 F.2d at 331.
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also had a disparate impact on men due to higher incidence of homosexuality
among males as opposed to females."' The DeSantis court first rebuffed the
plaintiffs' claims of "sex-plus" discrimination by asserting that homosexual
men and women were being treated equally: "[W] e note that whether dealing
with men or women the employer is using the same criterion: it will not hire or
promote a person who prefers sexual partners of the same sex."13 This
theory -that ideas about how members of one sex should behave are acceptable
as long as they are accompanied by "mirror-image" 36 rules for the other-no
longer holds in the Ninth Circuit. 37 But even in circuits that require
asymmetrical disparate treatment of men and women, courts have found that
antigay or antitrans harassment can violate Title VII. 38
The DeSantis court's other argument against relief- its appeal to legislative
history39 - is no more dispositive. DeSantis's explicitly redistributive reading of
Title VII as exclusively focused on "plac[ing] women on an equal footing with
men" 4° is difficult to square with Oncale,4 to say nothing of Ricci v.
DeStefano.42 Going forward, the fear of "bootstrap[ping]" that courts
frequently invoke in denying Price Waterhouse protection to gender-deviant
134. Id. at 330. But see Gary J. Gates & Frank Newport, Special Report: 3.4% of U.S. Adults Identify
as LGBT, GALLup (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poIV158o66/special-report-adults
-identify-lgbt.aspx [http://perma.cc/H4E6-PsQG] (finding that women were slightly more
likely to answer "yes" to the question "Do you, personally, identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual,
or transgender?").
135. DeSantis, 6o8 F.2d at 331.
136. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 208-09, 214 n.64 (1994) (providing examples and a
critique of such reasoning).
137. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 ( 9th Cir. 2001) ("To the extent it conflicts
with Price Waterhouse, as we hold it does, DeSantis is no longer good law.").
138. Judges who have found gender-deviant men to be less successful in the workforce than
gender-deviant women have premised relief on sex-plus theories. See, e.g., Martin v. New
York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 4 3 4 , 446 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (suggesting that,
if pled with sufficient specificity, an allegation that masculine female prison guards are
treated better than effeminate male guards could constitute a claim of sex discrimination);
see also Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Corp., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating
that a bank's denial of a loan application from a man dressed in women's clothing may
constitute illegal discrimination).
139. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30.
140. Id. at 329 (quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)).
141. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). According to the narrowest reading of Oncale, the plaintiff faced
discrimination relative to a hypothetical female coworker. See supra notes 117-128 and
accompanying text.
142. 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (suggesting that steps taken to ensure equal footing violate Tide VII
except in circumstances giving rise to a "strong basis in evidence" for disparate impact
liability).
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homosexual plaintiffs43 is likely misplaced. Nevertheless, DeSantis and its
progeny are still widely cited for the proposition that, if Congress had intended
Title VII to forbid sexual orientation discrimination, it would have said so. If
this seems confusing, it is: courts that adopt the broader reading of Price
Waterhouse have struggled to reconcile prohibiting discrimination based on
gender deviance with permitting discrimination against individuals whose
sexual orientation leads them to be perceived as gender deviant.
Two cases illustrating both sides of this coin are Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises' and Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble.4 Both cases involved gay
employees facing adverse employment action. However, because the Nichols
plaintiffs were able to frame their claim in formally sexual-orientation-neutral
terms, they succeeded where Dawson failed. The Nichols court, focusing on
instances in which a gay male server was referred to as "'she' and 'her.' . . . and
a 'fucking female whore,' ' 6 found that the harassment, while consisting
partly of antigay slurs, "reflected a belief that [the plaintiff] did not act as a
man should act" 47 and thus gave rise to a colorable claim of Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping. By contrast, because Dawn Dawson "conflated" her claims of
sex stereotyping with claims of explicit antigay discrimination,148 and because
"[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the
question that . . . . Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination
because of sexual orientation,"'" Dawson's claims, according to the court,
constituted impermissible bootstrapping of sexual orientation into existing
protections.
As Zachary Kramer, Brian Soucek, and others have noted, this case law is
both doctrinally and descriptively incoherent; Kramer decries courts'
subsuming all prescriptive sex stereotyping of gay plaintiffs into "sexual
orientation simpliciter claims in disguise, '' O whereas Soucek notes that courts
attempting to separate antigay bias from ideas about gender deviance do so
"solely by fiat." 5' This problematic case law puts LGBT plaintiffs in a delicate
position and can doom unsophisticated plaintiffs who do not carefully observe
the artificial distinction between antigay bias and gender norms that courts
143. E.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005).
144. 256 F. 3 d 864 (9 th Cir. 2OO1).
145. 398 F. 3 d. 211.
146. Nichols, 256 F.3 d at 870.
147. Id. at 874.
148. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 217.
149. Id. (quoting Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F. 3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000)).
150. Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 205, 219 (2009).
isi. Soucek, supra note 27, at 731.
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require. However, courts' insistence on this distinction arises in large part from
case law holding that, by refusing to amend Title VII to explicitly protect
LGBT workers, Congress has made clear its lack of intent to do so.
1 2
LGBT rights organizations are now attempting to write explicit legal
protections for LGBT workers into state and federal law. Recently, gay-rights
groups have been able to pass variants of ENDA in more than twenty states
and the District of Columbia," 3 and they hope to pass a federal version in the
next few years. A federal ENDA would have far-reaching implications; in
addition to providing relief in straightforward sexual-orientation-
discrimination claims, I"4 such a law would vitiate the doctrine forbidding
"bootstrap[ping]" ' sexual orientation claims into Title VII and would allow
for a far cleaner application of sex stereotyping to cases involving gay and
lesbian plaintiffs. However, the application of ENDA, and the gaps in current
law that it seeks to address, are themselves subjects of debate. The EEOC
recently ruled that discrimination against transgender workers already violates
Price Waterhouses6 and is bringing similar claims on behalf of victims of anti-
LGB discrimination. 7 Meanwhile, President Obama has signed an executive
order instituting protections modeled on ENDA for employees of the federal
government and its contractors s8 Consequently, disentangling the potential
protections offered by ENDA from those found in Price Waterhouse is a serious
challenge, and one that this Part hopes to address.
It is always difficult to interpret hypothetical legislation. However, in order
to determine exactly how ENDA would differ from the protections Price
Waterhouse provides, we must first sort out what exactly ENDA would do. The
most recently proposed legislation states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . .
because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
identity," s9 mimicking the language of Title VII itself. However, it is currently
unsettled whether ENDA would contain Title VII's motivating-factor
1s2. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 6o8 F.2d 327, 329-30 ( 9 th Cir. 1979).
153. In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions [http://perma.cc
/K9X4-24K3].
154. See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
155. DeSantis, 6o8 F.2d at 330.
156. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Decision No. 012012o821, 2012 VVL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012).
,57. NAT'L PUB. RADIO, supra note 26. A recent opinion by the District Court for the District of
Columbia endorses this view, but does so emphasizing the limited procedural requirements
of 12(b)(6) for civil plaintiffs. See Terveer v. Billington, No. 12-129o(CKK), 2014 WL
1280301, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2014).
158. Exec. Order 13, 672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 23, 2014).
159. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755,1 3th Cong. S 4(a)(1) (2013).
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language. The version of the bill introduced in the House of Representatives
does not contain an equivalent to the Civil Rights Act's "motivating factor"
test, and in the absence of such language, the Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted "because of' as requiring strict but-for causation. 6° By contrast,
the Senate version of the bill includes Title VII's motivating-factor and same-
decision tests.16 Until legislation is passed, it is impossible to know which
version will be written into law. Nevertheless, while the impact of this split
could be substantial for plaintiffs like Ann Hopkins, whose employers used
both proper and discriminatory evaluative tools,162 courts still generally read
this language to require group disparities in treatment in every context but
prescriptive sex stereotyping. The motivating-factor provisions of Title VII
recognize discrimination without a difference in outcome at the individual level.
However, outside of cases that challenge gender conformity demands and are
thus understood as falling under Price Waterhouse, this form of discrimination
is still defined as a preference for one group of workers over another, and it is
still expected to be shown through comparisons between members of different
groups.163 Therefore, ENDA would provide a group of potential plaintiffs who
currently only have Price Waterhouse claims with the sorts of narrow provisions
found elsewhere in Title VII. This makes sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination an excellent test case for understanding how Price
Waterhouse builds on traditional understandings of discrimination. Sex
stereotyping and traditional protections address fundamentally different types
of bias, and they can work together to benefit plaintiffs who have been
woefully underserved thus far.
B. Price Waterhouse in Practice
Instead of considering ENDA as an improvement on, or substitute for,
stereotyping protections, 6 4 this section considers how one can fill gaps left
behind by the other. A traditional discrimination framework can offer superior
16o. For recent cases specifically discussing the interpretation of "because of" in the employment
context, see University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532-33
(2013), which held that retaliation provisions of Title VII were not covered by 703(m)'s
motivating-factor framework, and thus should be interpreted according to "traditional
principles of but-for causation;" and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343,
2350 (2009), which applied similar reasoning to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 621-634, another statute using "because of" language.
161. S. 815, 113th Cong. §§ 4(h), lo(e) (2013).
162. See S. REP. No. 113-105, at 8 (2013) (discussing the importance of the motivating-factor
language).
163. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 748-51; Sullivan, supra note 18, at 200-02.
164. See Soucek, supra note 27, at 786-87.
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protection in many circumstances. 65 However, ENDA itself would be unable
to address certain kinds of antigay workplace bias, just as narrow readings of
Title VII fail to address such bias in other contexts. Here, I consider two types
of plaintiffs who, although suffering discrimination that is immediately
cognizable as antigay, would be unable to find relief under ENDA. I then
discuss how Price Waterhouse might offer these plaintiffs a better chance at
relief. These types of plaintiffs are offered as examples. While they represent
only one part of the Price Waterhouse litigation landscape, considering how
these plaintiffs would be treated under ENDA and Price Waterhouse shows how
the theories of discrimination accepted in sex stereotyping jurisprudence can
address stubborn, broader problems in antidiscrimination law.
1. The "Gayer" Plaintiff: Should Intragroup Differentiation Doom a
Lawsuit?
One useful example of the way in which straightforward sexual-orientation
discrimination claims fail in cases where sex stereotyping would succeed is that
of the "gayer" plaintiff-in other words, of an LGBT person who is treated
worse than another employee of the same sexual orientation who behaves in
such a way as to deflect attention from her status. 66 Probably the most obvious
example is that of a particularly flamboyant gay male employee, or a lesbian
with a short haircut, but other cases raise a broadly similar problem. Consider
the case of Shahar v. Bowers, in which a lesbian employee of the state of Georgia
had her job offer revoked after she married another woman. 67 In response to
Shahar's allegation that the adverse action was motivated by mere animus
against homosexuals and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause under
Romer v. Evans, 6 8 Judge Edmondson held that "[c]onsidering . . .public
reaction to a future Staff Attorney's conduct in taking part in a same-sex
'wedding' and subsequent 'marriage' is not the same kind of decision as an
165. See infra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
166. There is a long literature describing how minorities perform this sort of compensatory
behavior. The seminal account is ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT
OF SPOILED IDENTITY 102-04 (1963), but the concept has been adapted in two more recent
accounts that are more explicitly focused on the legal treatment of minorities. See Carbado &
Gulati, supra note 16, at 1301-04 (discussing "comforting acts"); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, iii
YALE L.J. 769, 9o9-1o (2002) (using Goffman's terminology of "covering").
167. 114 F. 3 d 1097, 110oo-o (lith Cir. 1997).
168. Id. at iiio (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). Fourteenth Amendment cases
involving workplace discrimination generally track Title VII, at least in the disparate
treatment framework. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976) (describing the
specific context- disparate impact-in which Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment
differ).
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across-the-board denial of legal protection to a group because of their
condition, that is, sexual orientation or preference. "169
In other words, Bowers's actions were not discriminatory because they
were not "across-the-board"; since these actions only disadvantaged individual
homosexuals, not homosexuals as a class, they could not constitute antigay
discrimination. 170 In other words, because of intragroup differentiation, 17 or
differences in treatment across out-group members, Shahar could not
demonstrate legally cognizable discrimination. It should be clear that this
problem would vanish if Shahar's potential employer used ascriptive rather
than prescriptive stereotyping to motivate his decisionmaking. If Shahar's job
offer were rescinded based on an ascriptive stereotype that all gay employees
were lazy or deceitful, then there would be clear differences between the
treatment of gay and straight employees generally that could support a claim.
It is this difference that would doom a theoretical ENDA suit -an employer
who is offended by an employee's same-sex marriage, and fires her after the
wedding, does not commit "sexual orientation" discrimination as traditionally
understood. After all, the employee did not suddenly become a lesbian,17 ' and
the employer can point to an openly gay worker (the plaintiff herself, prior to
the wedding) who did not face the same action. Generally speaking, such a
comparator kills an employment claim: if similarly situated employees who
share the employee's protected status are treated better, then courts assume
that the difference must be something other than status.'73 Courts make this
assumption even though the adverse employment action reveals what would
commonly be perceived as discriminatory animus towards the group generally,
as well as a preference for members of that group who work to minimize their
perceived affiliation therewith. Theoretically, in order for employees to claim
sexual orientation discrimination in these circumstances, they would have to
claim that whatever behavior led to the adverse action (flamboyance, a
169. Shahar, 114 F .3d at 111o.
170. See id. ("Romer [which held that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution forbidding
municipalities from offering homosexuals employment protections failed Fourteenth
Amendment rational basis scrutiny] is about people's condition; this case is about a person's
conduct.") (emphasis added).
171. For useful elaborations of this term, see, for example, Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial
Diversity, 60 UCLAL. REv. 1130, 1135-38 (2013).
172. I am assuming that the plaintiff did not announce her sexual orientation through a public
wedding - if the supervisor took these actions immediately upon learning of Shahar's sexual
orientation, her claim would almost certainly lie.
173. See Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 1998); supra
notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
marriage, or perhaps "gay" behavior outside of the office)' 74 actually constituted
part of their sexual orientation.
That said, courts have generally frowned on attempts to read conduct that
is neither universal to a group nor limited to its members as functionally
equivalent to a protected Title VII status -one case that sheds light on how
such claims might fare under ENDA, and on the broader impact of Title VI's
discomfort with intragroup differentiation, is Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc."'s
Renee Rogers challenged "a grooming policy of the defendant American
Airlines that prohibits employees in certain employment categories from
wearing an all-braided hairstyle.",, 6 Notably, Rogers did not claim that the no-
braids policy had a disparate impact on African-Americans due to biological
difference or even due to disparate hairstyle preferences among members of
different races.' 77 Instead, she claimed that her hairstyle was itself part of her
race.'78 This is the same type of claim that flamboyant gay plaintiffs alleging
discrimination under traditional doctrines would have to raise - that
discrimination based on certain kinds of conduct is discrimination based on a
protected status, even if this conduct is not universal to members of the
protected status category -and it failed in Rogers for the same reason. Judge
Sofaer critiqued Rogers's case on several grounds, but two are relevant here:
Rogers's hairstyle was not "immutable,"1 79 and white women could also
174. See, e.g., Patrick McCreery, Beyond Gay: "Deviant" Sex and the Politics of the ENDA
Workplace, 61 Soc. TEXT, Winter 1999, at 39, 39.
175. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
176. Id. at 231.
1i. See Yoshino, supra note 166, at 890 (describing how Rogers could have supported a
disparate impact claim); see also Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the
Immutability Requirement in Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2216-17 (2003)
(endorsing the use of disparate impact to address cultural discrimination). While I agree
with Gonzalez that "it may be that cultural discrimination and disparate treatment are a
poor fit," id. at 2217, Gonzalez underestimates the evidentiary problems disparate impact
would pose. In order to make out a prima facie case that American Airlines's policy had a
disparate impact on black women, Rogers would likely need to survey a large number of
employees and perform a fairly sophisticated statistical analysis. Requiring that plaintiffs
either do this demanding work or hire an expensive expert would discourage litigation
almost as strongly as did Rogers's ultimate holding, and the current incarnation of ENDA
contains no disparate impact provisions under which a similar gay plaintiff could even state
a claim. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 8 15, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong.
4(g) (2013); Reed, supra note 25, at 295-300.
178. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (quoting the plaintiff as arguing that braids reflect the "cultural
[and] historical essence of Black women in American society" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
179. Id. at 232 ("[Braids are] not the product of natural hair growth but of artifice. An all-braided
hair style is an 'easily changed characteristic,' and, even if socioculturally associated with a
particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the application
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engage in the same practice."' Both of these critiques apply to flamboyant
LGBT plaintiffs; the behavior giving rise to discrimination is neither
immutable (one can avoid getting married, speak with a deeper voice, or
discuss different topics at work), nor coterminous with membership in the
protected class. 8 ' Furthermore, both of these claims again reflect the difficulty
of applying Title VII to prescriptive stereotype. Here, because the prescription
against traditionally African-American hairstyles did not affect all black
women, and did affect some white women, the judge's opinion did not take
full account of the biased thinking it might reflect. Rogers is still good law, and
a good normative case can be made that it should be: as Richard Ford notes in
his seminal book on race and culture, a black woman who does not understand
her identity as requiring braids would find that Rogers's theory "not only
hinders her ... but it also adds insult to injury by proclaiming that cornrows
are her cultural essence. " s2 Nevertheless, from a litigation perspective, Rogers
and the principle it stands for-that employers can punish behaviors
"socioculturally associated with ""3 a protected status without discriminating-
hamstring employees who face prescriptive workplace norms that express a
clear preference for practices commonly associated with one group over those
associated with another, but that nevertheless remain formally status-blind. 84
of employment practices by an employer.") (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th
Cir. 1980)); see also Gonzalez, supra note 177, at 2217-18 (discussing the interplay between
immutability and the adverse effect requirements of a Title VII claim).
18o. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232; cf. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 379-80 (describing the implications of
treating Bo Derek's braided hairstyle in the movie lo as an aesthetic choice devoid of racial
content).
181. Gonzalez would suggest that a plaintiff allege that, say, disapproval of flamboyant behavior
disparately impacts gay men. See Gonzalez, supra note 177, at 2221-22. That said, such a
plaintiff would need to show a statistically significant disparity in specific behaviors between
heterosexual and homosexual populations, which would be nearly impossible. Alternatively,
a plaintiff could bring a "sexual-orientation-plus" claim, proving discrimination by showing
that heterosexual employees were treated more leniently for the same behavior. This would
not only present potential evidentiary difficulties (in finding a similarly flamboyant
heterosexual coworker), but would likely lead to further confusion as that employee could
face discrimination based on an imputation of homosexuality. See infra Part II.B.
182. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRBTIQUE 25(2005).
183. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
184. Admittedly, this is subtly different from the nature of the stereotypes at work in Price
Waterhouse. Rather than a stereotype about how different groups should behave differently,
American Airlines employed a stereotype demanding that all employees follow the
appearance norms of a dominant group. However, the reasoning is still the same-this sort
of "enforced covering" is more easily cognizable under a prescriptive stereotyping
framework than under a group disparity framework, for precisely the reasons the court
describes. See Caldwell, supra note 18o, at 381 ("In Rogers, the court clearly considered the
prohibition of all-braided hairstyles to relate more to American's choice of the image it
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Anecdotally, the Rogers principle is a frequent hurdle for plaintiffs in states that
offer sexual orientation protection based on the traditional model. Jessie
Weber, a civil rights attorney working in Maryland, describes how defendants
accused of antigay harassment frequently show a preference for gender-
conforming LGB employees, and use this difference in treatment to show that
their discrimination was not based on "sexual orientation" in a legally
cognizable fashion, even if the harassment itself consisted of antigay speech.'
In these cases, while the discrimination clearly arises from antigay bias, the
employer's preference for gender-conforming, "less gay" coworkers makes the
case unintelligible without a Price Waterhouse framework.
But is that such a bad thing? As long as it is possible for the victim of
discrimination to conform to her employer's expectations - as long as some gay
people can function in the workplace, or black employees can succeed at the
cost of a hairstyle- should we worry about these expectations 186 It is clear that
the current regime, which protects stereotypically "gay" conduct without
protecting LGBT status, raises serious problems. Soucek is undoubtedly
correct that sex stereotyping, by protecting only employees who combine
LGBT status with other forms of gender-deviant flamboyance, can encourage a
problematic form of "reverse covering."',8 However, his proposed remedy-
conceiving of antigay discrimination solely in the narrower terms found
elsewhere in Title VII -leads to a different and equally problematic result. By
penalizing gay employees whose gender expression subjects them to greater
antigay animus than gender-conforming coworkers, traditional understandings
of antidiscrimination law simply ratify the sorts of prescriptions that were
condoned by the Rogers court and are still widely accepted in other contexts. By
contrast, Price Waterhouse allows plaintiffs to attack these prescriptions
directly. In doing so, Price Waterhouse doctrine responds effectively to two very
different normative critiques of workplace culture.
On one hand, demands that employees act in a way that is stereotypically
associated with their status (such as those made of Ann Hopkins or Isabell
Slack) impose difference on workers who simply want to engage in the same
behavior as everybody else, and do so in a way that obviously falls
disproportionately on members of the stereotyped group. 8 On the other,
would promote for its business than to plaintiffs race, gender, or both .... But what is
American's conception of a business-like image?").
185. Interview with Jessie Weber, Attorney, Brown, Goldstein & Levy LLP, in Baltimore, Md.
(Mar. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Weber].
186. See Gonzalez, supra note 177, at 2219 ("The problem, put simply, is that mutability does not
negate adversity.").
187. Soucek, supra note 27, at 775 (quoting KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON
OURCIVIL RIGHTS 23(2006)).
188. Schultz, supra note 121, at 1754-55.
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demands that employees not engage in behavior that they associate with their
own culture (such as those made of Renee Rogers) may be a simple reflection
of egalitarian professionalism demands, 8' but may also reflect an employer's
distaste for what is perceived as minority expression,19 ° and employees are then
forced to conform their behavior to that distaste. These critiques may seem
diametrically opposed, but they both arise from the same basic problem-
employers are evaluating employees not according to any job-relevant criterion,
but according to discriminatory ideas about how men and women should
behave, or how "black" hairstyles look in an office setting. The concern here is
not in how these prescriptions apply to members of different groups, but in the
ideas motivating the prescriptions themselves. Regardless of whether one is
worried about stereotypes creating difference, on the one hand, or erasing it,
on the other, Price Waterhouse allows plaintiffs to question the reasoning
behind policies asking them to conform their behavior to sexist or racist ideas.
These biased conformity demands themselves run deeply counter to the
antisubordination norms animating American antidiscrimination law. In their
seminal article about performing minority identity in the workforce, Devon
Carbado and Mitu Gulati discuss some of the normative problems posed by a
workplace that conditions acceptance of minority employees on their adherence
to majority norms. 9' Carbado and Gulati note the disparate psychic harm of
this adherence; minority employees may find assimilating to the norm, even if
theoretically possible, to be draining or alienating in a way that nonminority
employees do not.'92 This can either be understood as an objectively heavier
burden -actions which would seem innocuous when performed by a white
woman might seem more troubling when performed by a black male
employee 93 - or, alternatively, as a neutral norm that becomes heavier on
minority employees due to different norms governing off-work behavior.'94
Returning to the case of LGBT discrimination, although many straight
189. See FORD, supra note 182, at 155 (referring to American Airlines's hairstyle policy as
"consistent with other practices in an industry that was famous for its obsession with
business image").
19o. Caldwell, supra note 18o, at 381 (suggesting that courts consider whether policies like those
at issue in Rogers are "motivated by the complex of negative associations with black
womanhood").
191. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1294-98.
192. Id. at 1294 ("The law ignores the extra costs to people of color imposed by implicit
workplace expectations that require people of color .. . [to] disidentify themselves from
other people of color in order to 'blend in."').
193. Id. at 1292; see also GOFFMAN, supra note 166, at 43-44.
194. See GOFFMAN, supra note 166, at 113-14 (discussing how stigmatized groups value and
encourage the expression of stereotyped traits).
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employees who engage in flamboyant behavior are simply treated as gay, '9 a
culture of adherence to traditional heterosexual norms may be more troubling
to employees who are used to different forms of interaction elsewhere in their
lives, or whose deviance is more salient due to their LGBT status. Furthermore,
this environment provides cover for more straightforward discrimination, and
employees who attempt to conform to the prescriptions governing their
workplace may find themselves powerless to attack that discrimination in
court. ,6 Punishing only employers who discriminate against an entire class,
and not just against individuals who exhibit behaviors associated with that
class, allows employers to continue evaluating workers according to bigoted
criteria.197 Given the Civil Rights Act of 1991's punishment of bigoted
decisionmaking processes, even if these processes do not lead to discriminatory
actions as traditionally understood, 98 it is difficult to see how employers who
punish LGBT plaintiffs for failing to adhere to a norm that is itself based on
discriminatory ideas should escape liability. 99
Price Waterhouse can provide this sort of protection. Unlike traditional
discrimination claims, which presume a plaintiffs membership in a large,
undifferentiated group and a defendant's discrimination against that group,"
claims of prescriptive sex stereotyping assume that each employee is being
evaluated individually, and then assert that the criteria used in that evaluation
reflect impermissible bias. The difference is subtle, but important for resolving
the intragroup differentiation puzzle. Instead of having to show that all LGBT
workers were treated poorly in comparison to heterosexuals, the plaintiff can,
under a Price Waterhouse theory, isolate the specific conduct that she believes
led to her firing and demonstrate its importance by comparing herself to other
workers (homosexual or otherwise) who acted differently. If the plaintiff can
successfully demonstrate that the defendant was motivated by his dislike of
195. See infra Part II.B.2.
196. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1295-96.
197. Id. at 1297-98.
198. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 703(m), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(m) (2012). In other
words, an employer who makes a decision that can be justified without reference to a
protected status may still have to change their processes if a status served as a "motivating
factor" in their decision.
199. See Schultz, supra note 121, at 1802 ("Regardless of whether the harassment assumes an
explicitly gender-based content or more subtly attacks people because of their failure to
conform to the harassers' image of proper manly behavior, the harassment is based on
gender.").
200. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1298 ("[In cases where discrimination is focused
upon one member of the group, rather than the group itself, [t] he court is likely to conclude
that the reason for the termination was simply the employer's dislike of the individual,
which does not produce an actionable discrimination case.").
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these behaviors, the question then becomes whether that dislike was motivated
by discriminatory ideas about how different sexes should behave. This is a hard
question for plaintiffs to answer, but it is a fair question for courts to ask, and it
gets at the heart of what makes sex stereotyping so pernicious. Price Waterhouse
claims, by focusing on specific behaviors rather than group identification, allow
courts to reach subtler and more individuated forms of sex, and sexual
orientation, discrimination.
Furthermore, the problems Price Waterhouse addresses are hardly gay-
specific. Inasmuch as any Title VII identity forms a mix of immutable status (I
am Jewish because my parents are Jewish, my appearance is Jewish, and my
genetic background is Ashkenazi) and voluntary performance (I am Jewish
because I choose not to work on the Sabbath, or to fast on Yom Kippur, or
even to use Yiddish expressions), Price Waterhouse's consideration of dislike
becomes critical. A workplace where an employee can be fired for engaging in
any sort of discretionary cultural performance is a workplace without real
diversity, and Price Waterhouse offers a conceptual framework through which
courts can address these coercive norms both in and out of the sexual-
orientation context.
2. The "Gayed" Plaintiff. Can Heterosexuals Be the Victim ofAntigay
Harassment?
Price Waterhouse doctrine also improves on traditional discrimination
theories in dealing with non-group-identified plaintiffs who nevertheless face
harassment based on group bias. In the sex-stereotyping context, this issue is
usually raised by heterosexual plaintiffs who face antigay harassment due to
their perceived gender deviance. Consider the plaintiffs in Doe by Doe v. City of
Belleville,"° whose case appears tailor-made for a straightforward claim of
antigay harassment. Although the plaintiffs identified as straight, one was
repeatedly called "fag" and "queer," and the defendants intimated that the
plaintiffs were having a homosexual relationship and belonged in "San
Francisco with the rest of the queers." 2 These statements look like plain
accusations of homosexuality- if ENDA protects plaintiffs on the basis of
"actual or perceived" sexual orientation," 3 the case should lie. But here, it is
not at all clear that the plaintiffs were perceived as homosexual. In one telling
incident, a coworker joked that one of the plaintiffs had spread poison ivy to
the other through anal sex; other coworkers responded "that if that were the
case, then Dawe [the man who had made the original remark] must have
201. 119 F.3d 563 ( 7th Cir. 1997).
2o2. Id. at 566-67.
203. H.R. 1755, § 4(a)(1), 113th Cong. (2013).
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contracted a rash as well, since he was always taking H. 'out to the woods."' 4
Taken literally, Dawe is also being perceived as gay. Nowhere in the case does
it suggest that Dawe was gay or faced homophobic harassment; on the
contrary, these imputations of homosexual orientation and conduct are clearly,
simply, metaphors."°
The plaintiffs burden is thus made insurmountable. According to the
traditional framework of a Title VII claim, in order to make a prima facie case
of employment discrimination, an employee must demonstrate, among other
things, that he or she is a member of a protected class. °6 Since these plaintiffs
would be unable to prove actual homosexuality or bisexuality, they would need
to show that they were perceived as homosexual or bisexual; if their harassers
were accusing each other of engaging in homosexual sex without actually
perceiving themselves to be gay, then it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove
that similar taunts reflected perceived homosexuality when aimed at them.
Even if a defendant actually did view his victim as gay, it is unclear how a
plaintiff could show that; jokes about a plaintiffs homosexuality could not
support an inference of perceived homosexuality if similar jokes were made
about individuals who were definitely not seen as gay, and threats of
homosexual sexual assault would, if anything, support a traditional sexual
harassment claim." z Without Price Waterhouse, these employees would fall into
a doctrinal black hole; even under ENDA, men who were effeminate enough to
be accused of being gay, but who were nonetheless never believed to be gay,
would receive no protection (absent actual or threatened sexual violence).2o8
204. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 567.
205. In fact, the other defendants even encouraged Dawe to engage in homosexual conduct with
the plaintiff: "Once, in reference to Dawe's repeated announcement that he planned to take
H. 'out to the woods' for sexual purposes, Goodwin asked Dawe whether H. was 'tight or
loose,' 'would he scream or what?"' Id. Both the plaintiffs and defendants in Belleville
identified as heterosexual, see id. at 568; it seems odd to take the defendants' taunts as prima
facie evidence of perceived homosexuality, when they made similar claims about each
others' behavior while still identifying as straight. See also Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk
Prods., Inc., 332 F. 3d 1058, lO63-64 (describing imputations of homosexual conduct among
coworkers as part of a broader pattern of "horseplay"). But see Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic
Contract ofBisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 446-54 (2000) (arguing that distinguishing
between sexual harassment and "horseplay" itself denies potential bisexuality among sexual
harassment defendants).
206. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
207. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (holding that same-
sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII).
208. They might not receive protection even in the case of such violence; although Kevin
McWilliams was fondled and very nearly raped by his coworkers, the Fourth Circuit held
that, because the harassers were not homosexual, this assault did not constitute harassment
because of sex. McWilliams v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F. 3d 1191, 1193, 1195 &
n.5 (4th Cir. 1996); Yoshino, supra note 2o5, at 438-39.
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In these circumstances, ENDA would offer no redress to employees who
have suffered behavior that would strike the average observer as not only
offensive2"9 but discriminatory. However, the reason ENDA would fail is that
the discrimination at issue is not antigay in any traditional sense. These
employees are not perceived as homosexual men-Kevin McWilliams's
coworkers told him that "[t]he only woman you could get is one who is deaf,
dumb, and blind"' -but as failed men; the sexual violence and taunting
described in Belleville and McWilliams follow from that initial perception. In
each of these cases, the plaintiffs seem to have been evaluated on their
adherence to masculine prescriptive norms: one of the plaintiffs in Belleville
wore an earring, the other was ridiculed for physical weakness, and Kevin
McWilliams suffered from cognitive and behavioral disabilities." Again,
because the discrimination is focused on individuated perception and
evaluation, as opposed to stereotypes about how men as a class actually behave,
traditional interpretations of Title VII cannot grasp the biased heuristics that
led to these plaintiffs' harassment. The bias becomes apparent, however, upon
even a cursory search. This interplay between gender deviance and presumed
homosexuality is perhaps more obvious in cases involving masculine women;
women who violate sex stereotypes are often accused of homosexuality, and
courts understand these accusations to arise from sex rather than sexual
orientation discrimination. 1' Gender-deviant heterosexual men, however, face
a problem- if their harassment does not harm LGBT workers or male workers
as a class, then how can it be legally cognized?
Courts in these cases can, and should, rely on sex-stereotyping doctrine.
Assuming that the imputation of homosexuality was triggered by a perceived
deviance from prescriptive sex stereotypes, plaintiffs can allege Price
Waterhouse discrimination regardless of whether they were actually perceived
as homosexual or merely accused of being so. While gay slurs could still be
used to show that the harassment created "an objectively hostile or abusive
209. See McWilliams, 72 F. 3d at 1196 ("That this sort of conduct is utterly despicable by
whomever experienced; that it may well rise to levels that adversely affect the victim's work
performance; and that no employer knowingly should tolerate it are all undeniable
propositions.").
210. Id. at 1193.
211. Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7 th Cir. 1997); McWilliams, 72 F. 3 d
at 1193.
212. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 331, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing a
supervisor's use of the word "dyke" as part of a pattern of sex discrimination); see also
Schultz, supra note 121, at 1785 (discussing how courts' unwillingness to read discrimination
against flamboyant gay males as sex stereotyping "exclud[es] people identified as gay from
the protection from gender stereotyping extended to all other people as men and women.").
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
work environment," 13 a sex-stereotyping claim deemphasizes the plaintiffs
perceived membership in a victimized group and focuses on the harasser's
bigoted evaluation.
Once again, case law at the state level shows the importance of sex
stereotyping for plaintiffs who face the language of antigay harassment without
identifying or being perceived as gay. The case that originated sex-stereotyping
doctrine in New Jersey, Zalewski v. Overlook Hospital2 14 presented a male-on-
male sexual harassment claim with no evidence of perceived homosexuality;"5
the court adopted a Price Waterhouse theory of sex stereotyping precisely
because the remedy for sexual orientation discrimination was not available.1 6
DePiano v. Atlantic County 7 makes the distinction between sex stereotyping
and antigay harassment even more explicit, as it comes after New Jersey
amended its Law Against Discrimination (LAD) to include sexual orientation.
Atlantic County argued that the plaintiff, a cross-dressing heterosexual male,
8
could not prevail under LAD without evidence that he was actually perceived to
be homosexual or bisexual. 9 The court, however, denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and accepted DePiano's claim that "under the
LAD's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex a plaintiff need not be
perceived as homosexual. Rather ... a plaintiff may bring an LAD claim for
discrimination or harassment based on gender role stereotyping."" In cases
where insisting on a sexual orientation discrimination theory would present an
unacceptable evidentiary burden, courts accept sex-stereotyping claims instead.
Were an ENDA to pass, it is easy to see how this application of the Price
Waterhouse doctrine could - and should - survive.
213. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
214. 692 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
215. Id. at 131-32.
216. Id. at 136 ("There is no rhyme or reason for allowing sexual harassment claims by men
against women, women against men, and harassment because of one's sexual orientation
and yet permit and condone severe sexual harassment of a person because he is perceived or
presumed to be less than someone's definition of masculine.").
217. No. Civ.02-5441 RBK, 2005 WL 2143972 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2005). For the final disposition of
this case, see No. Civ.o2-5441 RBK, 2006 WL 1128710 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2006).
218. DePiano enjoyed cross-dressing and specifically engaged in cross-dressing with his wife.
Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 4, DePiano 2005 WL 2143972 (No. 02-5441); DePiano, 2005 WL
2143972, at *3.
219. DePiano, 2005 VL 2143972, at *7- The LAD did not protect against gender identity
discrimination at that time; even if it had, however, it is not at all clear whether the court
would have extended these provisions to heterosexual, cisgender men who occasionally
cross-dress.
220. Id. DePiano later lost at trial, where the judge held that he "did not establish a hostile work
environment because he didn't demonstrate the motivation for the discipline was really his
cross-dressing." DePiano, 2006 WL 3392869 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2006).
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But what does this teach us about Price Waterhouse's applicability beyond
sexual orientation? In some ways, not much-sexual orientation is arguably
unique in how it serves as a metonym for broader gender transgressions. The
problems that sex stereotyping addresses in New Jersey do not come up in
other contexts. For example, an employee who does not participate in racist
workplace norms will not suddenly be considered African-American. However,
this point could also be framed as an argument for Price Waterhouse's greater
relevance outside of the sexual orientation context. Workplaces that police
gender norms punish outlaws using the language of antigay discrimination,
leaving themselves at least somewhat vulnerable under traditional frameworks.
What about, say, a white employee who is punished for supporting black civil
rights?"' That employee has no hope of a standard claim under McDonnell
Douglas, but Noah Zatz's argument that employees who refuse to endorse a
workplace's discriminatory action face "a form of stereotyping especially
repugnant to Title VII values" seems particularly on point here." 2 Cross-status
comparators get this employee nowhere, since this employer is unlikely to treat
black employees any better and will probably be much friendlier to racist white
workers. Nonetheless, if the employee can demonstrate that her support for
civil rights caused the adverse employment action (quite likely through
comparison to other white employees with different racial attitudes),' Price
Waterhouse would permit relief, as long as the prescriptive stereotype that
employees should not support civil rights reflected racist thought.' The
question of whether a given action reflects discriminatory thought seems like
the better question to ask, both analytically (since such a theory better reflects
what is actually occurring) and normatively. Discursively imposing
homosexuality on gender-deviant employees sends disturbing and
subordinating messages: homosexuality is effeminacy,7 effeminacy is
2n1. Cf. Chandler v. Fast Lane, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (recognizing a Title
VII claim by an employee who was forced to resign because she refused to participate in her
employer's discriminatory hiring program, on retaliation and associational grounds).
Employees are protected from retaliation for opposing discriminatory action, 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe-3(a) (2012), but it is not at all obvious how such protection could function in the
absence of actual discrimination by the employer against a member of an identifiable
minority group.
222. Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup
Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 116 (2002).
223. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
224. See Zatz, supra note 222, at 114 ("In particular, such discriminatory dynamics may be
premised on the organization of the workplace into agonistic groups defined along race and
gender lines.").
225. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 870 (9 th Cir. 2001).
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failure, ' 6 and effeminacy is weakness. 7 The fact that these ideas are expressed
through harassment of straight employees does not make them less harmful,
and sex stereotyping allows us to pierce through the irrelevant distraction of
perceived group membership to see the degrading force of the norms at work.
Sex stereotyping is a nimble doctrine - its ability to look past groups to find
contextual bias makes it a potentially valuable tool to fight discriminatory
dynamics in the modern workplace. The following Part considers in more
detail how sex stereotyping can interact with federal or state ENDAs to protect
workers more effectively.
III. COMPLEMENTARITY, NOT COMPETITION: HOW PRICE
WATERHOUSE CAN WORK WITH TRADITIONAL PROTECTIONS
To date, the debate over how to best protect LGBT workers has been
markedly zero-sum; scholars and advocates urging the passage of ENDA have
treated it as either superseding a flawed substitute doctrine," or offering
protections in a field where none currently exist. 9 This need not be so. A
federal ENDA can work with sex-stereotyping protections to fight workplace
bias more effectively than either doctrine could alone, and the normative
considerations underlying both theories of discrimination can function in
harmony.
A. Using ENDA 's "Because of' Provision to Fight Straightforward Antigay
Harassment
To begin with the obvious point, many cases of discrimination really are so
straightforward that ENDA uncontroversially applies. For example, the recent
New York decision Salemi v. Gloria's Tribeca, Inc.23 held that an employer who
repeatedly referred to homosexuality as a "sin" and said that homosexuals
"were going to hell"231 discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation under
New York City's Human Rights Law. Here, the employer's statements refer to
gay people as a single undifferentiated class, and the animus they reflect applies
equally to all members of that class. There is no need to interrogate the
prescriptions that underlie the statements, because they so clearly harm gay
226. See McWilliams v. Fairfax Cnry. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F. 3 d 1191, 1193 (4 th Cir. 1996).
227. Miller v. City of New York, 177 F. App'x 195, 196-97 (2d Cir. 20o6).
228. Soucek, supra note 27, at 786.
229. See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014).
230. 115 A.D.3d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
231. Id. at 569.
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people based solely upon their sexual orientation and thus constitute sexual
orientation discrimination under even restrictive readings of antidiscrimination
law. This employer clearly harassed gay employees "because of' sexual
orientation, no matter how one interprets the phrase.
While the interpretation of Price Waterhouse urged by the EEOC and
adopted in Terveer could still cognize this behavior as harmful stereotyping,232
it would do so using a framework that perfectly mimics traditional Title VII
litigation -in order to establish what particular trait led to the adverse action,
the plaintiff would still need to show the employer's animus towards
homosexuals. However, folding sexual orientation entirely into sex-
stereotyping jurisprudence would interpose an extra step, requiring each
plaintiff to argue, once again, that antigay bias reflects harmful ideas about
how men and women should behave. Furthermore, treating all gay plaintiffs as
gender-deviant imposes a real, if subtle, dignitary harm. Plaintiffs who
perceive themselves as gender-conforming should be able to claim protections
without using a framework many feel reifies offensive stereotypes. 33 Finally,
and not inconsequentially, proving sex stereotyping is not cheap. Price
Waterhouse cases often rely on expert testimony to show the gendered nature of
the employer's behavior;234 by comparison, if an employer makes blatantly
antigay remarks or fires a worker immediately upon their disclosure of LGBT
status, then ENDA allows a far more practical route to relief. Just as Price
Waterhouse provides a more effective tool for combating subtle, context-
specific, and individual discrimination, traditional protections have real power
against open, class-based animus.
One question, however, remains: if ENDA's "because of' provisions and
Price Waterhouse each attack different kinds of bias, then how can they interact?
Paradoxically, one of ENDA's most immediate effects would be radically
strengthening sex-stereotyping protections-as discussed above, one of the
biggest hurdles facing Price Waterhouse plaintiffs is Congress's perceived intent
not to protect against sexual orientation discrimination.23 ENDA would
remove this barrier and allow gender-deviant LGBT plaintiffs to bring sex
stereotyping and ENDA claims concurrently. In practice, these claims are often
most powerful together; defendants frequently claim that adverse actions were
232. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
233. See Soucek, supra note 27, at 775-76; Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 909-1o
(2002). This phenomenon is, of course, hardly unique to sexual minorities; for a more
general discussion, see GOFFMAN, supra note 166, at 81.
234. See Goldberg, supra note ii, at 797-98 (discussing the importance of experts for legitimating
the contextual analysis required by sex stereotyping suits).
23S. See supra notes 144-152 and accompanying text.
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236based on sexual orientation in response to a sex stereotyping claim, or
defend against a state law sexual-orientation claim by citing the employee's
gender-deviant behavior or manner of dress as disruptive or upsetting to
others. 237 As long as only one set of protections is in place, employers will claim
that behavior that would violate the other constituted a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.238 Both theories work in
concert, however, to protect employees who suffer from antigay discrimination
as it frequently appears in the modern workplace: as an inchoate mix of antigay
bias and heterosexist ideas about how men and women should behave. ENDA
works within a legal framework designed to equalize outcomes across easily
identifiable groups, whereas sex stereotyping seeks to ensure that the
workplace is free of subtler, more contextual bias. In practice, these approaches
often go hand in hand. Allowing plaintiffs to present evidence of both theories
of discrimination gives courts better information, allows plaintiffs the dignity
of having their entire story heard in court, and prevents biased employers from
hiding behind mutually exclusive defenses.
B. Price Waterhouse Protections in ENDA Itself.
Another potential avenue for stereotyping suits is through ENDA itself,
using either the motivating-factor provisions set out in the Senate version of
ENDA2 9 or the new gender-identity protections common to both.4 °o I hope
that I have shown how an LGBT plaintiff could bring a hypothetical "sexual-
orientation-stereotyping" claim if that survives, but the gender-identity
provisions of ENDA are novel and deserve a closer look. While ENDA's
prohibition on firing or harassment "because of . . .gender identity"" is
generally considered a remedy for a discrete group of plaintiffs who identify as
transgender,' 42 the statutory definition of "gender identity" is sufficiently
broad to encompass something superficially very much like Price Waterhouse
236. See, e.g., Appellee's Brief on Behalf of the Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emps., Local 46,
Gilbert v. Country Music Ass'n, Inc., 432 F. App'x 516, No. 09-6398, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Apr.
12, 2010); Weber, supra note 185.
237. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 29 3 , 302 (D.D.C. 2008).
238. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (describing the
defendant's burden of proving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action
against a plaintiff who has made a prima facie case of discrimination).
239. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. 5 4 (h), lo(e).
240. Id. at § 4(a)(1); H.1L 1755, 113th Cong. § 4(a)(1).
241. H.R. 1755 § 4(a)(1).
242. See, e.g., Hannah Moch, In Historic Move, Senate Committee Approves Trans-
Inclusive ENDA, GLAAD (July 10, 2013), http://www.glaad.org/blog/historic-move-senate
-committee-approves-trans-inclusive-enda [http://perma.cc/Z56Y-LDYF].
124:39 6 2014
SEX STEREOTYPING AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
protection. Specifically, ENDA defines gender identity as "the gender-related
identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics of an
individual, with or without regard to the individual's designated sex at
birth.""43 ENDA gender-identity protections could pose many of the same
problems that Price Waterhouse was designed to address -plaintiffs who face
discrimination on the basis of gender-deviant mannerisms will likely be unable
to show their membership in a broad enough category to generate the sort of
comparative evidence that courts typically require. Instead, they would have to
show the salience of a particular mannerism in their own firing and then prove,
at a second stage, that the mannerism in question formed a part of their gender
identity.
Such a process seems, at first, like a perfect analogy to a Price Waterhouse
stereotyping claim-it would certainly seem to offer relief to plaintiffs like
Brian Prowel, whose behaviors were avowedly effeminate, 44 or even Gregory
DePiano, whose deviance from the norm of his workplace had a clear gendered
component."4s But what about plaintiff H. in Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville,
who may have been expressing any number of cultural commitments by
wearing an earring;, 46 or Mark McWilliams, who was harassed because of a
developmental disability; 7 or Joseph Oncale, whose gender deviance similarly
existed only in the minds of his tormentors? 4'
243. S. 815 § 3(a)(7) (emphasis added); see Case, supra note 28, at 1366-67 (discussing the
confusion surrounding ENDA's definition of gender identity).
244. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cit. 2009) ("Prowel identifies himself
as an effeminate man and believes that his mannerisms caused him not to 'fit in' with the
other men at Wise.").
245. DePiano v. Atlantic Cnty., No. Civ. o2-5441 RBK, 2005 WL 2143972, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 2,
2005) (referring to the male plaintiff dressing in women's clothing).
246. 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7 th Cit. 1997).
247. McWilliams v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3 d 1191, 1193 (4 th Cir. 1996)
(describing McWilliams' harassment based on his disclosure of cognitive and emotional
developmental disabilities).
248. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998). One important caveat to
this difference is ENDA's protection against discrimination on the basis of "real or
perceived" gender identity. Unlike sexual orientation, where defendant harassers frequently
used antigay slurs in contexts that made clear they did not in fact view the plaintiffs as gay,
they almost certainly did view the plaintiffs as gender-deviant. See supra Part II.B.2.
However, a showing of discrimination based on perceived gender deviance is analytically no
different than the type of sex stereotyping claim I have already described-the plaintiff
would have to show that his or her employer perceived a difference between the plaintiff and
other coworkers, that the employer discriminated based on that difference, and that the
employer read that difference as related to sex or gender. While the steps occur in a different
order (unlike a sex stereotyping case, a perceived-gender-identity plaintiff would have to
show the gendered nature of the evaluation at the prima facie stage), the nature of the proof
is exactly the same.
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This sex-stereotyping theory looks, instead, very much like the alternate
proposal made recently by Zachary Kramer, who proposes a reasonable-
accommodation model built on Title VI's current protections for religious
practices. Under Kramer's theory, a plaintiff would be expected to show that a
given mannerism or appearance reflected his or her sincere gender
commitments and that a defendant was unwilling to reasonably accommodate
those commitments. 49 The difference between Kramer's proposed solution
and the one that already exists in Price Waterhouse is the fundamental
difference between a Title VII that protects gender-deviant plaintiffs and a
Title VII that prohibits gender-based evaluation. Claims proceeding under
Kramer's accommodation model must begin by showing that the plaintiffs
idiosyncrasy is both "sex based" and "sincerely held."2"0 Under this approach,
plaintiffs like Doe, McWilliams, and Oncale would be unable to show that they
viewed the traits that led to their harassment as "sex based," and thus to make
out even a primafacie claim.
Of course, this could be the right answer-such an approach certainly
ensures that claims will only be raised by individuals whose sincere gender
commitments stand sufficiently far outside the norm to require
accommodation. If we read Title VII as Justice O'Connor did in Price
Waterhouse, as concerned with the protection of out-group members and not
with the tools employers use more generally, then Kramer has the right
solution; Congress cares about discrimination only when it directly impacts a
member of a protected group. But Congress overrode Justice O'Connor. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 reveals a broader commitment- to stamp out bias and
bigotry in the workplace no matter whom it affects. Stereotypes can be deeply
subordinating towards disfavored groups even when applied to group
nonmembers-as long as an employee is harassed based on outdated and
offensive ideas about sex, gender, race, or any other Title VII category, there is
no need to bother with the secondary inquiry of the employee's own
commitments."' LGBT plaintiffs may succeed under Kramer's theory-they
may be able to demonstrate that their disfavored traits arise from a disfavored
249. Kramer, supra note ii, at 938-40; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 71-76, 84 (1977) (articulating the test for religious accommodations under Title VII).
2SO. Kramer, supra note ii, at 947. Kramer institutes these sincerity tests as a response to the
danger of what he calls "stretch" - that is, the danger of courts treating any employer
preference for certain behaviors among employees as sex discrimination. Id. Kramer
proposes distinguishing between employers' discriminatory and nondiscriminatory trait
preferences by asking what the trait means to the employee. By contrast, Price Waterhouse
treats this as a question, first and foremost, about employers; about which methods they use
to choose favored and disfavored behaviors, and which ideas underlie those methods.
zsi. See Schultz, supra note 121, at 1786 ("It is the accusation rather than the actuality that is
relevant.").
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gender identity. But, as Jessie Weber put it to me, "the beauty of the sex
stereotyping claim is that it applies to everyone."2"2
CONCLUSION: PRICE'S PROMISE
It is impossible to overstate the impact of Price Waterhouse on the American
workplace, but stating it accurately isn't much easier. Statistics on unreported
discrimination suits are notoriously unreliable, to say nothing of the claims
settled before an EEOC inquiry, or the changes that workplaces make in order
to prevent violations from occurring. Nevertheless, the conceptual changes
wrought by Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are tremendous
in scope, and they offer a vision of antidiscrimination law that courts still only
partially recognize. Because federal antidiscrimination law is formally blind to
sexual orientation and gender identity, courts have been unable to use
traditional tools of group protection to justify protecting LGBT workers.
Instead, Price Waterhouse demands that judges interrogate the cause or purpose
of employers' differentiation between their employees." 3 It questions whether
the heuristics that employers use to evaluate their employees themselves reflect
impermissible bias. This doctrine has bloomed from arid soil; both Price
Waterhouse and its progeny dealing with anti-LGBT discrimination arose from
courts seeing clear discrimination without a clear statutory solution, and the
analytic moves underlying prescriptive sex stereotype show remarkable
sensitivity to the nature of the modern workplace.
In particular, what Price Waterhouse can acknowledge, and what traditional
group-based remedies do not specifically address, is the extent to which
oppressive stereotypes are mala in se, regardless of the disparate group
outcomes they might or might not create. These stereotypes hurt everybody.
Irrational and degrading norms about how men and women should behave,
how different races should interact, and what cultural practices are fit for
professional life limit everyone's identity, not just members of subordinated
groups. s4 Price Waterhouse allows plaintiffs to focus on these harmful norms,
but it is currently available only in the limited sphere of gender deviance. Sex
stereotyping is a valuable part of our Title VII jurisprudence and should
survive the passage of traditional sexual orientation and gender identity
protections. More than that, however, the ideas that Price Waterhouse espouses
should be better understood and embraced far, far more broadly. In an often
252. Weber, supra note 185.
253. Id.; see also Schultz, supra note 121, at 1776 ("This form of [sex-stereotype-based]
harassment, like harassment of women workers, perpetuates job segregation by sex.").
2s4. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 192 (2oo6);
Schultz, supra note 45 (manuscript at 130); Weber, supra note 185.
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hostile world, Price Waterhouse has given gender-deviant plaintiffs a strange
and precious gift. Now it is time to share.
I I
